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Liberty in Loyalty:
A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law
Evan J. Criddle*
Conventional wisdom holds that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is a
prophylactic rule that serves to deter and redress harmful opportunism. This
idea can be traced back to the dawn of modern fiduciary law in England and
the United States, and it has inspired generations of legal scholars to attempt
to explain and justify the duty of loyalty from an economic perspective.
Nonetheless, this Article argues that the conventional account of fiduciary
loyalty should be abandoned because it does not adequately explain or justify
fiduciary law’s core features.
The normative foundations of fiduciary loyalty come into sharper focus
when viewed through the lens of republican legal theory. Consistent with the
republican tradition, the fiduciary duty of loyalty serves primarily to ensure
that a fiduciary’s entrusted power does not compromise liberty by exposing
her principal and beneficiaries to domination. The republican theory has
significant advantages over previous theories of fiduciary law because it
better explains and justifies the law’s traditional features, including the
uncompromising requirements of fiduciary loyalty and the customary
remedies of rescission, constructive trust, and disgorgement.
Significantly, the republican theory arrives at a moment when American
fiduciary law stands at a crossroads. In recent years, some politicians,
judges, and legal scholars have worked to dismantle two central pillars of
fiduciary loyalty: the categorical prohibition against unauthorized conflicts
of interest and conflicts of duty (the no-conflict rule), and the requirement
that fiduciaries relinquish unauthorized profits (the no-profit rule). The
republican theory explains why these efforts to scale back the duty of loyalty
should be resisted in the interest of safeguarding liberty.
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Introduction
Fiduciary relationships are ubiquitous in American law,1 but judges and
legal scholars have struggled in the past to explain precisely when, why, and
how fiduciary duties apply.2 Conventional wisdom holds that a relationship
triggers the fiduciary duty of loyalty whenever one party (the principal) has
reposed special trust and confidence in another (the fiduciary), thereby
exposing herself or others (the beneficiaries) to a heightened risk of injury.3
Yet, aside from a handful of well-established fiduciary relationships such as
trustee–beneficiary, guardian–ward, and attorney–client, there is
considerable uncertainty about just how broadly the duty of loyalty extends.4
Equally troubling, the nature and scope of the duty of loyalty have become
matters of intense debate. Some experts argue that the duty of loyalty
requires fiduciaries merely to avoid conflicts of interest and relinquish profits
to their principals,5 while others defend a much more robust conception of
loyalty that would include obligations to deliberate and pursue beneficiaries’
interests with affirmative devotion.6 Scholars disagree, as well, over the

1. Fiduciary duties arise, for example, in the law governing trusts, agency, corporations,
partnerships, pensions, investment banking, bankruptcy, charities and nonprofits, family
relationships, guardianship, employment, legal representation, and medical care. See generally
TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011) (discussing these and other fiduciary relationships).
2. See Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 972, 976 (2013)
(observing that “we know relatively little about the justification for fiduciary duties” and “[t]he
boundaries of fiduciary obligation are poorly defined”).
3. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A fiduciary relation arises
only if ‘one person has reposed trust and confidence in another who thereby gains influence and
superiority over the other.’” (quoting Amendola v. Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 1990))).
4. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1991) (observing that “the
precise nature of the fiduciary relationship remains a source of confusion and dispute”).
5. See, e.g., MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE
PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 59 (2010) (affirming that “fiduciary duties are
proscriptive rather than prescriptive”); Stephen A. Smith, The Deed, Not the Motive: Fiduciary Law
Without Loyalty, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY 213, 213–14 (Andrew S. Gold &
Paul B. Miller eds., 2016) (arguing that the duty of loyalty is comprised exclusively of the noconflict and no-profit rules and that loyalty is not a concern of fiduciary law).
6. See, e.g., Peter Birks, Lionel Cohen Lecture, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR.
L. REV. 3, 11–12 (2000) (“[T]he best way into the trustee’s obligation is through the word ‘altruism.’
The trustee is under an obligation to act in the interest of another.”); Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J.
Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations, 20 LEGAL THEORY 106, 107 (2014) (“A
fiduciary whose deliberation is not shaped [by the fiduciary obligation to her beneficiary] does not
live up to her fiduciary obligation, no matter what else she does.”); Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex
Ante and Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 209, 220–23 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014)
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS] (citing marriage as the paradigmatic fiduciary
relationship because spouses bear robust duties of loyalty to one another that may “evolve, and
become more demanding, as circumstances develop”).
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extent to which parties may modify or waive the duty of loyalty by contract,7
and whether the “pulpit-thumping rhetoric” courts use to describe fiduciary
duties promotes or undermines the rule of law.8 These debates are beginning
to spill over from academic commentary into judicial decisions, legislation,
and uniform laws, sowing inconsistency and uncertainty in American
fiduciary law.9
This Article argues that the fiduciary duty of loyalty comes into clearest
focus when viewed through the lens of republican legal theory.10 The central
message of republican legal theory is that legal norms and institutions are
necessary to safeguard individuals from “domination,” understood as
subjection to another’s alien control (arbitrium).11 Fiduciary power is
dominating in this sense if a fiduciary is capable of acting “without reference
to the interests, or the opinions, of” her principal and beneficiaries.12
Fiduciary law’s classic duty of loyalty combats domination, I argue, by
ensuring that a fiduciary’s actions are legally required to track the terms of
her mandate and the interests of her beneficiaries.13
Although private law scholars have generally neglected the link between
republicanism and fiduciary law in the past,14 the republican foundations of
7. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary duties are fundamentally contractual duties), Henry
Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 447–49 (1998) (arguing that fiduciary duties are default
contractual rules), and John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625, 655–56 (1995) (asserting that “fiduciary law is contractarian” and fiduciary duties are
“default norms imposed in juridical relations”), with Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735,
1780–89 (2001) (arguing for limits on contractual waiver by contending that permitting a fiduciary
“to opt out of [the commitment to pursue the beneficiary’s interests and not her own] undermines
both the very foundation and the source of the economic value of the concept of a fiduciary
relationship”), Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 249 (1995) (“[T]he core duty-of-loyalty rules should not be subject to a general
waiver.”), and Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default
Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 71 (2005) (arguing that courts should not enforce broad exculpatory clauses
of fiduciary duties).
8. Langbein, supra note 7, at 629. Compare CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 107–09 (rejecting
moralistic rhetoric in fiduciary jurisprudence as an irrelevant distraction), with Blair & Stout, supra
note 7, at 1809–10 (defending fiduciary law’s affirmation of moral and social norms).
9. See infra subpart II(E).
10. The interpretive methodology employed in this Article is inspired by John Rawls’s concept
of “reflective equilibrium,” in that it takes the law’s core features at face value and seeks to distill
the basic normative structure underlying them. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1971).
11. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 55 (1997).
12. Id.
13. See id. (observing that under republican theory “an act of interference will be nonarbitrary,” and accordingly nondominating, “to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and
ideas of the person suffering the interference”).
14. By way of illustration, a recent collection of essays on the “philosophical foundations of
fiduciary law” does not contain a single reference to republicanism as a normative theory of

CRIDDLE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

996

4/4/2017 1:40 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 95:993

fiduciary law have been hiding in plain sight for centuries. Generations of
republican judges,15 political theorists,16 and legal theorists17 have invoked
fiduciary obligation. See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6. In previous
writings on public fiduciary theory, Evan Fox-Decent and I have drawn explicit connections
between republicanism and fiduciary law. See, e.g., EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT,
FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 103–04
(2016) (developing a republican fiduciary theory of international legal norms). To my knowledge,
however, this Article is the first to develop these connections systematically and defend
republicanism as an alternative to theories of fiduciary law that are premised upon classical
liberalism.
15. See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900) (describing public offices as “mere
agencies or trusts”); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880) (“[T]he power of governing is
a trust committed by the people to the government.”); Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (1 Wall) 441, 450
(1874) (“The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts, and that those clothed
with them are to be animated in the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice,
and the public good.”).
16. See, e.g., 1 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 87 (Walter Miller, trans. 1913)
(characterizing the “administration of the government” as “like the office of a trustee” and “must
be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one’s care, not of those to whom it is entrusted”);
THE FEDERALIST Nᴏ. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (affirming that all
public institutions serve as “agents and trustees of the people”); THE FEDERALIST Nᴏ. 65, at 397
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The delicacy and magnitude of trust which so
deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration
of public affairs speak for themselves.”); JAMES HARRINGTON, THE OCEANA AND OTHER WORKS
147 (1656) (“As an estate in trust becomes a man’s own, if he be not answerable for it, so the power
of a magistracy not accountable to the People, from whom it was receiv’d, becoming of private use,
the Common-wealth loses her liberty.”); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
§§ 142–43, at 75–76 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690) (describing legislative
power as a “trust” committed to the legislature for the benefit of the commonwealth); JOHN MILTON,
The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 3, 10 (Martin Dzelzainis ed., Claire
Gruzelier trans., 1991) (1649) (describing “the power of Kings and Magistrates” as “derivative,
transferr’d, and committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all, in
whom the power yet remaines fundamentally, and cannot be tak’n from them.”); PETTIT, supra note
11, at 8 (“The commonwealth or republican position . . . sees the people as trustor, both individually
and collectively, and sees the state as trustee: in particular, it sees the people as trusting the state to
ensure a dispensation of non-arbitrary rule. . . .”); QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE
LIBERALISM 109–11 (1998) (discussing “the idea of the state as the name of an artificial person
whose representatives are authorized to bear the rights of sovereignty in its name”); 2 JOHN
TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 267 (Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995)
(1755) (describing government as “[a] great and honourable Trust” in which “Honesty, diligence,
and plain sense, are the only talents necessary for the executing of this Trust; and the public Good
is its only End”).
17. See generally, e.g., CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 103–04 (developing an
interpretive theory of sovereignty under international law as a fiduciary relationship between a state
and its citizens); EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 112
(2011) (discussing the state–subject fiduciary relationship); Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees
of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295,
295–97 (2013) (characterizing sovereigns as trustees of humanity at large); Evan J. Criddle,
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEXAS L.
REV. 441, 446 (2010) (arguing that federal administrative law should promote “fiduciary
representation,” in which federal officers exercise authority for the benefit of a state’s subjects);
Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006)
(reframing the problem of agency discretion around the concept of fiduciary duty); Evan J. Criddle,
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private fiduciary relationships such as guardianship, agency, and trusteeship
to explain by analogy how state authority can be reconciled with individual
liberty. Just as fiduciary law prevents private law fiduciaries from exercising
arbitrary power over the interests of their beneficiaries,18 republicans argue
that public law safeguards liberty by ensuring that public officials wield their
entrusted powers as a “public trust”—i.e., subject to fiduciary norms of
loyalty and care.19 Thus, republican legal theory is premised on the idea that
the primary purpose of private fiduciary law—like public law—is to
safeguard freedom from domination.
In contrast, most legal scholars and judges today accept as an article of
faith that fiduciary law is devoted exclusively to deterring material harm—
an idea that resonates with classical liberalism rather than republicanism.20
The classical liberal theory of fiduciary law holds that there is nothing
inherently wrongful about fiduciary self-dealing, provided that conflicted
transactions do not harm beneficiaries’ material interests.21 Viewed from this
perspective, fiduciary law prohibits unauthorized conflicts of interest solely
as a prophylactic measure to deter harmful opportunism and compensate for

Standing for Human Rights Abroad, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2015) (arguing that states may
employ interstate countermeasures as fiduciaries to protect the human rights of foreign nationals
abroad); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259
(2005) (arguing that the fiduciary character of a state’s relationship with its people provides a
justification for its legal authority); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013)
(arguing that legislators are fiduciaries to the public for the purposes of insider-trading law); Gary
Lawson et al., The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014)
(describing the Constitution as a fiduciary document requiring equal protection of all citizens);
Ethan J. Leib et al., Essay, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013) (offering
a fiduciary theory of the judicial office); Ethan J. Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary Principles into
Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91 (2013) (applying fiduciary political theory to redistricting);
Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820
(2016) (assessing the utility and limitations of fiduciary political theory); Robert G. Natelson, The
Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1088–91 (2004) (arguing that the U.S.
Constitution is premised on a fiduciary conception of public authority); D. Theodore Rave,
Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013) (arguing that political representatives
should be treated as fiduciaries for purposes of redistricting).
18. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 31–32 (explaining that for republicans the “great evil” that
legal and political institutions must combat is “domination,” defined as “exposure to the arbitrary
will of another, or living at the mercy of another”).
19. See Natelson, supra note 17, at 1088–91 (listing fiduciary duties potentially applicable to
public officials).
20. See infra Part II. This Article uses the term “classical liberalism,” to distinguish the theory
from other “liberal” theories that are more closely aligned with republicanism. See Alan Ryan,
Liberalism, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 360, 360 (Robert E.
Goodwin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge eds., 2d ed. 2012) (emphasizing liberalism’s diversity).
21. See infra subpart II(A).
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courts’ inability to discern whether particular conflicted transactions
undermined beneficiaries’ interests.22
This classical liberal theory of fiduciary law, like the republican theory,
boasts a venerable pedigree. It features prominently in Keech v. Sandford,23
the English Chancery Court’s celebrated 1726 decision which ushered in the
modern era of Anglo–American fiduciary law.24 It also supplies theoretical
ballast for the first major American fiduciary law case, Davoue v. Fanning.25
And it has inspired generations of legal academics in the United States to try
to explain and critique fiduciary law from a purely economic perspective.26
Nonetheless, as an interpretive theory of fiduciary law—one that purports to
explain and justify the law’s core features from its own internal point of
view—the classical liberal theory is unconvincing.
Classical liberalism struggles, in particular, to explain and justify two
signature features of the fiduciary duty of loyalty: the categorical prohibition
against unauthorized conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty (the “noconflict rule”), and the requirement that fiduciaries must relinquish profits
obtained through conflicted transactions (the “no-profit rule”).27 As other
commentators have observed, there are good reasons to question the
consensus among scholars of law and economics that these rules are designed
22. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 62 (asserting that “the fiduciary doctrine is
prophylactic in its very nature”); Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 261, 261, 263–64 (characterizing fiduciary law’s
prophylactic rules as an outgrowth of equity); Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of
Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1045–46 (2011) (arguing that “the nature of fiduciary
governance as a system of deterrence [is] meant to minimize agency costs”).
23. (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223 .
24. Id. at 223–24.
25. 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 257 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
26. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 225, 228–35 (discussing the “economics of knowledge” and its
importance in explaining the fiduciary relationship); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting
Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1990)
(explaining fiduciary duties in the context of contracting problems); Cooter & Freedman, supra note
4, at 1074 (applying the economic “principal-agent” model to the concept of fiduciary
relationships); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 427 (concluding a “‘fiduciary’ relation is a
contractual one,” and applying “economic assessments of contractual terms and remedies” to
fiduciary duties); Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 393, 393 (2007) (concluding that when applying the economic perspective to the concept of
fiduciary duty, “ancient principle” is confirmed, and does not imply an “alteration of the
conventional position”); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J.
299, 313 (1993) (applying economic theory to the issue of “the scope of fiduciary duty”); Robert H.
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 677–83 (2004) (utilizing
economic theory, particularly the “principal-agent problem,” and applying agency-cost theory to
trust law). See generally Sitkoff, supra note 22 (synthesizing economic theory and fiduciary law).
27. See, e.g., Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Lord Herschell) (appeal taken from AC)
(Eng.) (“It is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position . . . is not,
unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a
position where his interest and duty conflict.”).
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to achieve optimal harm minimization.28 More fundamentally, classical
liberalism’s focus on deterrence is an awkward fit with fiduciary law because
the paradigmatic fiduciary remedies—constructive trust and disgorgement—
are restitutionary remedies, not punitive remedies.29 Taking classical
liberalism’s normative commitments seriously, therefore, would seem to
invite legislators and judges to strip fiduciary law down to its foundations
and reengineer fiduciary duties and remedies from the ground up.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that this reengineering process
is already well underway in the United States. Inspired by classical
liberalism, the Delaware Supreme Court has replaced the no-conflict and noprofit rules in corporate law with an “entire fairness” test that allows
corporate directors to conclude self-interested transactions without the
consent of either the corporation’s disinterested directors or its
shareholders.30 The past two decades have also seen a growing number of
states discard the no-conflict and no-profit rules in agency law and parts of
trust law.31 These departures from fiduciary law’s traditional requirements
have been premised on the idea that courts should intervene in fiduciary
relationships only as strictly necessary to rescue beneficiaries from material
harm.32
The republican theory developed in this Article challenges classical
liberals’ efforts to dismantle traditional fiduciary rules and remedies. As this
Article will demonstrate, the fiduciary duty of loyalty reflects the concerns
of republicanism rather than classical liberalism. The republican theory of
fiduciary law resonates with the venerable idea that fiduciaries in both private
and public law occupy a distinctive office that is constituted, defined, and
regulated by law.33 Unlike classical liberalism, republicanism bolsters the
28. See infra subpart II(D).
29. See infra subpart II(D).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 136–37.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 141–47.
32. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 823 (1983) (noting that “courts
will intervene in the fiduciary relation by requiring the fiduciary to act with loyalty and skill, in the
entrustor’s best interests”).
33. See SHELDON AMOS, THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF ROME 291
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. reprt. 1987) (1883) (observing that under Roman law “[t]he office of
guardian . . . was regarded as a service of public moment, and not of mere private convenience or
arrangement,” being imposed “as a public burden or duty to be rendered to the State”); 1 CICERO,
supra note 16, at 85 (“For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be
conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one’s care, not of those to whom it is entrusted.”);
Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations, in MAPPING THE LAW
577, 584–85 (Andrew Burrows & Alan Rodger eds., 2006) (arguing that the English Chancery
Court’s introduction of “[t]he idea that profit from [a private fiduciary] should be barred can
plausibly be connected to [Chancellor] King’s experience battling the abuses of [public offices] in
Chancery”); id. at 595–96 (explaining how English legal norms governing private and fiduciary
offices developed in tandem during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); Jedediah Purdy,
Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1847 & n.39 (2009)
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traditional duty of loyalty with its associated remedies by showing how
fiduciary law neutralizes the domination that would otherwise arise in
asymmetric relationships premised upon trust and confidence. A fiduciary’s
power to exercise entrusted power for and on behalf of her principal (or
pursuant to authority entrusted to her by law) would engender domination but
for the fact that fiduciary law compels a fiduciary to honor her principal’s
instructions and her beneficiaries’ interests. The republican theory thus
frames the fiduciary duty of loyalty as a liberty-enhancing safeguard that
denies fiduciaries the formal legal capacity to exercise arbitrary power. To
the extent that American law remains committed to the republican ideal of
liberty as freedom from domination, legislators and judges today should take
care to preserve and reinforce fiduciary law’s traditional legal requirements
and remedies.
The republican theory also clarifies fiduciary law’s proper scope,
explaining why some interpersonal relationships that pose a risk of harmful
opportunism qualify as fiduciary relationships (e.g., trustee–beneficiary),
while others do not (e.g., manufacturer–consumer).34 In particular,
republicanism offers a simple test for identifying fiduciary relationships:
Fiduciary duties apply whenever a party has been entrusted with power over
another’s legal or practical interests.35 The fiduciary duty of loyalty governs
relationships that meet this test because without this obligation a fiduciary
would have the capacity to work a double wrong: she could both (1) harm
her beneficiary’s legal or practical interests and (2) violate the trust reposed
in her by treating fiduciary power as an instrument for advancing her own
purposes. A fiduciary’s capacity to commit the second type of wrong—
breach of trust—represents a unique form of domination and therefore
justifies fiduciary law’s distinctive legal obligations and remedies. While
other species of private law such as contract, tort, property, and unjust
enrichment are capable of neutralizing the domination entailed in a private
party’s capacity for harmful opportunism in an arm’s-length relationship,
only fiduciary duties and remedies are calibrated to ensure that fiduciaries
lack the capacity to betray trust in a fiduciary relationship.

(emphasizing how this republican conception of the fiduciary office shaped early American political
theory). Scholars of business organization law have observed similarly that Anglo–American
corporations began as public entities chartered for public purposes. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 129–30 (3d ed. 2005) (“Banks, insurance companies,
water companies, and companies organized to build or run canals, turnpikes, and bridges made up
the overwhelming majority of these early corporations.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at
17 (1970) (“From the 1780’s well into mid-nineteenth century the most frequent and conspicuous
use of the business corporation . . . was for one particular type of enterprise, that which we later
called public utility . . . .”).
34. See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906, 911–13 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that cigarette manufacturers are not fiduciaries for consumers under Kansas law).
35. See infra subpart III(A).
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The remainder of this Article develops the republican theory of fiduciary
law in several stages. Part I offers a brief primer on legal republicanism,
summarizing the tradition’s distinctive conception of liberty as freedom from
domination. Part II introduces the classical liberal theory of fiduciary law
and explains how the classical liberal theory has shaped the development of
English and American fiduciary law. Part II also explains why theories of
fiduciary law that are based on classical liberalism—including economic
theories—do not offer a persuasive, interpretive account of the duty of
loyalty. Lastly, Part III explains how the republican theory both bolsters and
clarifies the traditional fiduciary duty of loyalty. In particular, the republican
theory offers an interpretively persuasive account of the normative
foundations of fiduciary law, it provides a simple test for identifying
fiduciary relationships, it clarifies the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and it
furnishes a principled justification for judicial deference to fiduciaries’
discretionary judgments. In each of these respects, republicanism lays a firm
theoretical foundation for fiduciary law’s traditional features.
To be clear, although this Article advances the thesis that fiduciary law’s
traditional structure reflects republican principles, it does not set out to prove
that judges in England, the United States, or other former British colonies
have deliberately drawn upon republican principles as they have developed
contemporary fiduciary law. Nor does it attempt to show that republicanism
can explain or justify every statute, regulation, or judicial decision involving
fiduciary duties. Some features of American fiduciary law—particularly in
the law governing corporations and other business associations—have
clearly drifted away from the republican theory. This Article does make the
case, however, that the traditional fiduciary duty of loyalty addresses
republican concerns about arbitrary power, and it aims to persuade the reader
that fiduciary jurisprudence could achieve greater coherence through deeper
engagement with the republican ideal of liberty as freedom from domination.
I.

Republican Legal and Political Theory: A Primer

To understand the role that republican theory has played, and might yet
play, in fiduciary law, we must first appreciate what makes the republican
tradition distinctive. Over the centuries, the term “republicanism” has been
used to capture a diverse collection of ideas, including popular sovereignty;
representative government; the constitutional separation of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers; civic virtue; inclusive public deliberation; and
universal citizenship.36 Indeed, the republican tradition has come to embrace

36. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541–42, 1586
(1988); see also Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, Law and Republicanism: Mapping the Issues,
in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 8 (Samantha Besson

CRIDDLE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1002

4/4/2017 1:40 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 95:993

so many diverse trends and voices that debates among the tradition’s
adherents threaten at times to overshadow the tradition’s core contribution to
legal and political theory.37 At its heart, however, republicanism offers a
distinctive account of the source and purpose of state authority. Specifically,
it asserts that all public officials and institutions derive their authority from
their people for the purpose of securing individual liberty.38 The state fulfills
its mission to secure liberty when it enacts and enforces laws that protect its
people from “domination.”39
To fully appreciate the republican ideal of liberty as freedom from
domination, it may be helpful to unpack what this term means for
republicans. The leading contemporary exponents of republicanism, Philip
Pettit and Quentin Skinner, have explained that domination for republicans
is subjection to another’s “arbitrary power” or “alien control.”40 If another
person can interfere in your choices as they like with impunity, you are
dependent on their will and “not sui juris—or not ‘your own person’—in the
expression from Roman Law.”41 You are no longer capable of acting as
“your own man,” freely exercising “your own right.”42 Instead, you are
“under the power of a master” (in potestae domini)—effectively a slave
rather than a fully emancipated, self-determining agent.43

& José Luis Martí eds., 2009) (describing some of the core themes of republicanism) [hereinafter
LEGAL REPUBLICANISM].
37. For a recent dustup over the meaning of “republicanism,” compare RANDY E. BARNETT,
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE
PEOPLE 50–51 (2016) (using the term “republicanism” to capture libertarianism), with Jack M.
Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 31 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E.
BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE
THE PEOPLE (2016)) (contrasting Barnett’s libertarianism with founding-era republicanism based
on freedom from domination).
38. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 8 (“The commonwealth or republican position . . . sees the
people as trustor, both individually and collectively, and sees the states as trustee . . . .”).
39. M. N. S. SELLERS, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: REPUBLICANISM, LIBERALISM AND THE
LAW 71–72 (1998) (describing James Madison’s republican vision of liberty).
40. Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theorems, in REPUBLICANISM AND
POLITICAL THEORY 102, 102 (Cécile Laborde & John Maynor eds., 2008); Quentin Skinner,
Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra,
at 83, 84–86; see also PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 1 (2012) (emphasizing “the evil of subjection to another’s will”).
41. PETTIT, supra note 40, at 7. The term “sui juris” is often translated as “free from power,”
meaning not subject to another’s domination. E.g., MAX KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 76 (Rolf
Dannenbring trans., 4th ed. 1984).
42. Skinner, supra note 40, at 86.
43. Phillip Pettit, Law and Liberty, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, supra note 36, at 39, 44; see
also LOCKE, supra note 16, § 22, at 17 (asserting that liberty entails not being “subject to the
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man”); 2 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra
note 16, at 430 (“Liberty is, to live upon one’s own terms; slavery is, to live at the mere mercy of
another . . . .”).
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Importantly, republicans contend that domination is wrongful even if
the empowered party never affirmatively interferes with the dependent
party’s choices. The mere fact that the empowered party has the capacity for
arbitrary interference underscores the dependent party’s vulnerability,
impressing upon the dependent party’s mind the need to remain within the
power holder’s good graces. The dependent party therefore faces “a
continual state of uncertainty and wretchedness,” characterized by the need
for constant invigilation, self-abasement, and self-censorship.44 This
condition of subservience persists even if the empowered party does not
exercise her power in an arbitrary manner. Accordingly, subjection to a
virtuous king or benevolent slave master is incompatible with liberty,
notwithstanding the fact that the king or slave master may always choose to
exercise power altruistically for the benefit of their subordinates. In these
relationships, the mere presence of alien control is sufficient to render the
subject or slave unfree.45
The republican conception of liberty as freedom from domination might
appear at first glance to be incompatible with government. Republicans
argue, however, that public authority does not constitute “alien control” if the
state is properly “checked” to ensure that it does not serve as an instrument
of arbitrary control.46 A state that interferes with private choices on a
nonarbitrary basis to secure a regime of secure and equal freedom does not
dominate its people. The key question for republicans, therefore, is whether
public institutions are hedged by sufficient legal and political safeguards to
ensure that they lack the formal and practical capacity to exercise power in
an arbitrary manner. If state action is “forced to track the avowed or avowalready interests of the interferee,” it is not arbitrary in the relevant sense and
therefore does not constitute a form of alien control.47 Thus, republicans
assert that the state can make, adjudicate, and enforce laws that constrain
individual autonomy without undermining liberty, provided that robust
safeguards are in place to guarantee that the state cannot disregard the public
interest with impunity.48

44. 2 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 16, at 430; see also Pettit, supra note 40, at 103
(emphasizing that alien control “invigilate[s] the choices of the controlled agent”).
45. See, e.g., SELLERS, supra note 39, at 71 (observing that James Madison in the Federalist
Papers “attributed tyranny to an excess of power, even in service of the common good”).
46. Pettit, supra note 40, at 117–18.
47. Id. at 117.
48. Some contemporary republicans, following a strand of republicanism that can be traced
back to Aristotle, contend that individuals, to be fully free, must participate in developing the laws
that govern them so that these laws can be understood as the product of their own authorship. See,
e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 322–23 (1996) (arguing that current disenchantment with American politics can be
alleviated by replacing the liberal, “voluntarist conception of freedom” with a return to republican
ideas of self-government and civic engagement); Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-
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Laws that deny public institutions the formal authority to wield alien
control are necessary to secure republican liberty, but they are not sufficient
to ensure that the state lacks the practical capacity for domination. Robust
legal and political institutions are also necessary to reduce the incidence of
arbitrary interference ex ante and ensure ex post that the state cannot exercise
alien control with impunity.
Republicans therefore emphasize the
importance of structural safeguards such as popular elections and interbranch checks and balances as safeguards for individual liberty.49 The role
of courts within republican theory is to affirm legal rules that formally rule
out domination, while enforcing these rules in a manner that minimizes
domination in practice. Because courts—like other public institutions—have
the practical capacity for arbitrary interference, republicans have argued that
judicial intervention should be calibrated to guard against overreach,
ensuring that judicial intervention in public governance minimizes overall net
domination.50
An important lesson of the republican tradition is that individual liberty
in the private sphere is also a product of effective institutional design.
Republican freedom is “an explicitly political notion of freedom,” Martin
Loughlin observes; “rather than being a natural or intrinsic human
characteristic, liberty is . . . created through governmental action,” as the
state makes and enforces laws to protect individuals from being subject to
others’ arbitrary power.51 Consequently, legal norms and institutions are
necessary to protect individuals from domination in the private sphere, just
as they are necessary to protect individuals from state domination.52
Communitarian Debate, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 159, 165 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
1989) (“In order to have a free society, one has to replace this coercion with . . . a sense that the
political institutions in which [citizens] live are an expression of themselves. The ‘laws’ have to be
seen as reflecting and entrenching their dignity as citizens, and hence to be in a sense extensions of
themselves.”). However, most republicans consider it “more important not to have a master than to
be a master.” ISEULT HONOHAN, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM 184 (2002). When legal norms and
institutions require public officials to exercise their entrusted powers in a manner that is calculated
to advance the public interest, republicans contend that these officials relate to the public not as
masters but as public servants. Id. at 158–61.
49. See, e.g., PETTIT, supra note 11, at 100–01 (noting Alexander Hamilton’s assertion that
“legislative balances and checks” and “the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies
of their own election . . . are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican
government be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided” (quoting THE FEDERALIST
NO. 9, at 72–73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
50. See Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy,
96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1418 (2008) (“[A] decision by courts to intervene in the political process should
be reconceptualized as a domination-minimizing institutional tradeoff . . . . Not only does this
tradeoff result in an overall net minimization of domination, it also constrains judicial intervention
to the most serious instances of domination. In this way, the antidomination model guards against
the danger of judicial overreaching.”).
51. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 174 (2010).
52. See John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Republicanism and Restorative Justice: An
Explanatory and Normative Connection, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 145,
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Although republican legal and political theorists have lavished attention
on public law, private law’s equally vital role in securing freedom from
domination has received less scrutiny.53 The clear implication of republican
theory, however, is that private law also may promote liberty by ensuring that
individuals are not consigned to live at the mercy of others. As Pettit has
explained, contract law is necessary “not just to facilitate voluntary
agreements among different agents, but to play a regulative role in
disallowing contracts that involve terms under which one party has the
possibility of dominating the other.”54 Tort law duties of care regulate the
domination that would arise if private parties could harm their neighbors
negligently, recklessly, or intentionally with impunity.55 Similarly, the law
of unjust enrichment arguably responds to the threat of alien control by
compelling individuals to restore property in their possession to the rightful
owner.56 Property law likewise can be understood to enshrine rights and
duties and supplies remedies to prevent private parties from wielding
unilateral control over others’ legally protected interests in resources.57 Thus,
viewed from a republican perspective, private law enshrines legal rules that
deny private parties the formal capacity for domination, while tasking courts
with enforcing these rules in a manner that is calculated to minimize overall
net domination in practice.58

149 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2000) (arguing that the “republican ideal of freedom
as non-domination” requires “restraining the private power . . . whereby people can be effectively
protected, informed and empowered in relation to one another”).
53. See generally, e.g., LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, supra note 36 (providing excellent essays on
republican approaches to constitutional law, criminal law, and international law, but ignoring
private law). Although private law scholars rarely invoke republicanism expressly, David
Dyzenhaus observes that republican liberty is “akin to the sense of freedom” defended by Kantian
private law theorists such as Ernest Weinrib and Arthur Ripstein. See David Dyzenhaus, Liberty
and Legal Form, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 92, 95–96 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis
Klimchuk eds., 2014).
54. PETTIT, supra note 11, at 165.
55. See David F. Partlett, The Republican Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1409, 1417–18 (2004) (suggesting that tort law responds to republican concerns about domination).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2011).
57. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 135 (arguing that nondomination best protects privateproperty rights).
58. Republicans have debated whether nondomination is best understood as a constraint on an
agent’s actions or as a value to be maximized. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 97–106 (distinguishing
these approaches and defending a consequentialist theory). This Article advances a mixed
approach. It endorses the nonconsequentialist view that law, to be legitimate, must respect
republican liberty by enshrining formal conduct rules that unequivocally affirm each individual’s
right to freedom from domination. See infra subparts III(A)–(D). Because nondomination must be
secured in practice through fallible legislatures and courts, however, the Article asserts that
nondomination must also operate as a maximand for the design of decision rules to govern judicial
review. See infra subpart III(E). A thoroughly consequentialist republican theory might generate
different conclusions regarding the optimal design of fiduciary conduct and decision rules.
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Generations of republican political theorists have argued that fiduciary
duties, in particular, preserve freedom from domination.59 For example,
Pettit asserts that an agent with power of attorney does not dominate her
principal because she is permitted to exercise this power “only on condition
that the interference promises to further [her principal’s] interests,” and
“according to opinions of a kind that [the principal] share[s].”60
Consequently, an agent does not relate to her principal “as a master,” but
rather as an extension of the principal’s own self-mastery.61 As Part III of
this Article explains in greater detail below, the legal requirements of
fiduciary loyalty formally rule out alien control in fiduciary relationships by
requiring a fiduciary to exercise her entrusted power in a manner that respects
the interests of her principal and beneficiaries. The norms and institutions of
fiduciary law thus safeguard republican freedom by ensuring that a fiduciary
lacks the formal and practical capacity to interfere arbitrarily in the affairs of
her principal and beneficiaries with impunity.
In sum, republicanism offers a distinctive theory of the purpose of legal
institutions based on the ideal of liberty as freedom from domination.
According to republicans, private parties suffer a special wrong whenever
their legal interests are subject to another’s arbitrary control, irrespective of
whether that control results in wrongful interference.62 Legal norms and
institutions are necessary under republican theory to ensure that the powerful
are unable to interfere arbitrarily in others’ affairs with impunity. Fiduciary
law thus contributes to the establishment of a free society by emancipating
principals and beneficiaries from domination at the hands of those who hold
entrusted power over their legal or practical interests.

59. See sources cited supra note 16.
60. PETTIT, supra note 11, at 23.
61. Id.
62. Republicans disagree about whether noninterference and nondomination are both essential
components of republican freedom. See Philip Pettit, Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a
Difference with Quentin Skinner, 30 POL. THEORY 339, 342 (2002) (arguing that republican
freedom is concerned solely with domination, while acknowledging Skinner’s claim that
republicans historically understood freedom to encompass both nondomination and
noninterference). Some theorists argue that nonarbitrary interference does not compromise
freedom, see, for example, PETTIT, supra note 11, at 75–76 (arguing that “[f]reedom as nondomination is compromised by domination and by domination alone,” not by interference or the
“influence of conditioning factors”), while others reject this thesis. See, e.g., Christian List & Laura
Valentini, Freedom as Independence, 126 ETHICS 1043, 1059 (2016) (criticizing republican
theories, like Pettit’s, that recast constraints on freedom as no restriction of freedom, “[c]ontrary to
ordinary-language use”); Evan Fox-Decent, Freedom as Independence 19–23 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (articulating and defending a version of republican freedom that
includes freedom from interference). This Article endorses the view that nonarbitrary interference
compromises freedom, but that such interference is wrongful only if it reflects alien control.
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Classical Liberalism in Anglo–American Fiduciary Law

Despite the longstanding association between fiduciary concepts and
republican legal and political theory, private law scholars today rarely
mention republicanism as a possible theoretical framework for explaining,
justifying, or critiquing fiduciary law. Although academics and judges often
identify factors such as power, trust, dominance, and vulnerability as defining
features of fiduciary relationships,63 they tend to characterize the no-conflict
and no-profit rules as “prophylactic” measures that are designed to address
the risk of harmful opportunism (per classical liberalism),64 rather than as
liberty-enhancing safeguards that rule out domination (per republicanism).
This Part examines classical liberalism’s enduring influence on Anglo–
American fiduciary law. It begins by laying out the tradition’s vision of
liberty as freedom from interference. It then considers how classical
liberalism has shaped fiduciary law’s development in England and the United
States, and it examines how legal scholars today—including leading
practitioners of law and economics—have endeavored to explain and justify
fiduciary duties and remedies based on the normative commitments of
classical liberalism. Lastly, this Part explores several important critiques of
classical liberalism as an interpretive theory of fiduciary law, and it explains
how the theory’s exclusive focus on wrongful interference has encouraged
legislatures and courts to set aside fiduciary law’s traditional no-conflict and
no-profit rules in some areas of American fiduciary law.
A.

Classical Liberalism and Fiduciary Duty

Contemporary republicans typically present their vision of liberty as an
alternative to classical liberalism, which focuses on “freedom as
noninterference.”65 Whereas republicans consider a power holder’s mere
capacity for arbitrary interference to undermine liberty (whether or not it
results in actual interference), proponents of classical liberalism contend that
individual freedom is compromised if (and only if) a person’s choices are

63. See, e.g., Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 102 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing unilateral power and vulnerability); Frankel, supra note 32, at 809–10 (characterizing
“abuse of power” as “the central problem” of fiduciary law); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1483 (2002) (suggesting that “the
strength of [fiduciary law’s] protection varies inversely with the potential for self-help on the part
of the vulnerable party”).
64. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 22, at 262–71 (describing features of fiduciary law as equitable
constraints on opportunism); Smith, supra note 63, at 1402 (explaining how the duty of loyalty,
which serves as the essential aspect of fiduciary duty, serves to mitigate against opportunistic
behavior by fiduciaries).
65. See, e.g., PETTIT, supra note 11, at 40–50 (contrasting “liberty as non-domination” from
liberty “as non-interference”).
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actually constrained by another.66 According to classical liberals, it is the
incidence or risk of choice-constraining interference—not alien control per
se—that renders a person unfree. Consequently, a person may be unfree
without suffering actual interference only to the extent that another has
actually interfered, or is likely to interfere, in their affairs to their detriment.67
In some respects, the republican conception of freedom is narrower than
the classical liberal conception. Unlike classical liberals, republicans
consider an individual’s formal subjection to a benevolent slaveholder to be
a form of unfreedom even if the slaveholder was disposed to treat the slave
well and refrain from interference in the slave’s choices.68 In other respects,
however, the classical liberal conception of freedom is narrower than its
republican alternative. For example, any interference in matters of personal
choice—not just arbitrary interference—compromises freedom under
classical liberalism. Accordingly, classical liberals tend to view laws that
constrain citizens’ choices as limitations on personal freedom even if the laws
are necessary to protect all members of society from domination.69 Although
they recognize that legal institutions are often necessary to protect individual
autonomy from private interference, classical liberals consider state
intervention in the private sphere to be appropriate only to the extent that
there is an actual risk of interference in matters of personal choice.70
Viewed from the perspective of classical liberalism, fiduciary duties
guard against the possibility that fiduciaries may harm their principals and
beneficiaries by interfering in their legally privileged choices. Most
fiduciaries have a unique capacity for harm because they are enlisted
precisely to carry others’ choices into execution.71 Accordingly, classical
liberals argue that the duty of loyalty is designed to address the threats of
material harm that arise within fiduciary relationships by requiring
fiduciaries to respect their principals’ choices and their beneficiaries’
66. See, e.g., MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM 157 (2003) (identifying
freedom simply as the ability to perform an action).
67. Ian Carter, How Are Power and Unfreedom Related?, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL
THEORY, supra note 40, at 58, 61–63; Matthew H. Kramer, Liberty and Domination, in
REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 40, at 31, 42–44.
68. See Cécile Laborde & John Maynor, The Republican Contribution to Contemporary
Political Theory, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 40, at 1, 4–5 (describing
Skinner’s and Pettit’s arguments that benevolent slave owners still subject their slaves to
unfreedom).
69. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 67, at 65–66 (arguing that there is no reason to privilege the
common interest over one’s personal interest when determining what counts as an instance of
unfreedom “unless this reason consists in a moral point of view”); Charles Larmore, A Critique of
Philip Pettit’s Republicanism, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 229, 234 (2001) (offering taxation as an example of
state interference for the common good that results in a loss of individual freedom).
70. See Kramer, supra note 67, at 42 (“[T]he soft-hearted dominator’s superiority is not in itself
a source of unfreedom; everything hinges on what the dominator does with his superiority.”).
71. Frankel, supra note 32, at 808–10.
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interests.72 Arguably, the first principle of agency law, for example, is that
an agent is required to follow her principal’s instructions.73 Trustees likewise
are obligated to honor the terms of their trust agreement,74 and corporate
officers and directors are bound to respect the requirements of their corporate
charter and bylaws.75 When a principal does not give her fiduciary precise
instructions, the fiduciary is required to honor the principal’s choices by
exercising her discretionary powers to advance the principal’s objectives and
protect beneficiaries’ interests.76 These features of fiduciary law are arguably
consistent with classical liberalism’s theory of freedom as noninterference.
Proponents of classical liberalism contend that there is nothing
inherently wrongful about a fiduciary engaging in conflicted transactions,
provided that the transactions are consistent with the principal’s objectives
and do not undermine the beneficiary’s material interests.77 For example, an
investment manager might find that she can maximize profit for an investor–
beneficiary by investing in a commercial venture in which she also has a
personal financial stake. According to classical liberals, the reason why
fiduciary law requires the investment manager to disclose and receive her
beneficiary’s consent to the conflicted transactions has to do with the
challenge of monitoring a fiduciary’s performance: it is often difficult for
investors and courts to discern whether a particular conflicted transaction was
actually the best option available to the fiduciary.78 Rather than saddle the
investor with determining whether a fiduciary’s self-dealing has harmed her
material interests, the no-conflict rule’s categorical prohibition against
unauthorized conflicted transactions forces the investment manager to obtain
the investor’s fully informed consent ex ante or face court-ordered rescission
or disgorgement ex post.79 Classical liberalism thus presents fiduciary law’s
72. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 32–50, 61–62.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (requiring an agent to
comply with all lawful instructions from the principal).
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (requiring the
trustee to administer the trust lawfully and diligently in accordance with the terms of the trust).
75. See, e.g., Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp., 250 P.3d 531, 533 (Alaska 2011) (affirming
that a corporate director breached his duty of loyalty by, inter alia, “refusing to comply with
corporate bylaws”).
76. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(2) (requiring the trustee to identify the
duties and powers of the trusteeship, and to effect returns and other benefits for the beneficiaries of
the trust).
77. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 108–09, 113–25 (asserting that a fiduciary can breach
her duty of loyalty without acting immorally); John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty
of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 934–35 (2005) (arguing that conflicts
of interest are not “inevitably harmful”).
78. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 77, at 938 (noting that categorically prohibiting conflicts of
interest may be appropriate when abuses are difficult to detect).
79. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 120 (asserting that the no-profit rule is a “prophylactic”
rule that reflects courts’ recognition “that when a fiduciary has made an unauthorized profit out of
his fiduciary position there will commonly or ordinarily be a conflict between duty and interest”);
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traditional no-conflict and no-profit rules as a pragmatic response to the
epistemic challenge of discerning whether conflicted transactions actually
respect the principal’s choices and promote the beneficiary’s best interest.
B.

The Rise of Modern Fiduciary Law

The classical liberal theory of fiduciary law can be traced back to the
English Chancery Court’s seminal 1726 decision, Keech v. Sandford.80 At
issue in the case was a lease to Rumford Market, which had been devised to
a trustee to hold in trust for an infant.81 When the lease was set to expire, the
trustee allegedly sought to renew the lease on the infant’s behalf.82 The lessor
refused to renew the lease, however, objecting that he would not be able to
defend his interests in court against an infant lessee in the event of the lease’s
breach.83 Finding the path to renewing the lease in the infant’s favor blocked,
the trustee opted to renew the lease on his own behalf.84 This action had the
effect of disrupting the infant beneficiary’s “customary, non-legal, but none
the less firm entitlement [under the principle of ‘tenant’s right’] to roll over
finite leases and thus maintain possession over long stretches of time across

R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 186 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing the
availability of the remedies of rescission and disgorgement to victims of the breach of fiduciary
duties); LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW 279 (2005) (emphasizing the necessity of obtaining
the principal’s express and informed consent before a fiduciary may enter into a self- or otherinterested transaction); cf. Langbein, supra note 77, at 964–65 (“An agent who wants to proceed
with a conflicted transaction need only persuade the principal to authorize it (which, of course, the
principal will resist, unless he or she determines the transaction to be in his or her best interest).”).
80. (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223; see also Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1045 n.1
(charactering Keech as fiduciary law’s “seminal case”). Although this Article does not afford the
space for an in-depth look at the history of the fiduciary concept, it bears noting that the republican
conception of fiduciary loyalty predates the classical liberty theory. See, e.g., 1 CICERO, supra note
16, at 85 (noting that one of Plato’s rules for those in charge of public affairs was to “keep the good
of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every
action conform to that”). Indeed, the introduction of formal fiduciary obligations in Roman law
arguably enshrined Cicero’s republican conception of the fiduciary relationship—albeit long after
the demise of the Roman Republic. See R. D. MELVILLE, A MANUAL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
ROMAN LAW RELATING TO PERSONS, PROPERTY, AND OBLIGATIONS 187–208 (3d. ed. 1921)
(discussing the legal obligations of guardians under Roman law); David Johnston, Trusts and Trustlike Devices in Roman Law, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TRUEHAND IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 45, 51 (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998) (discussing the
Roman law of fideicommissium). But see ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW 98, 117,
158 (1995) (arguing that Roman law was pragmatic, unsystematic, and untethered from
philosophy); Michele Graziadei, Virtue and Utility: Fiduciary Law in Civil and Common Law
Jurisdictions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 287, 288 (arguing that Roman
fiduciary law reflected an “economy of honor”).
81. Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations, in
MAPPING THE LAW, supra note 33, at 577, 581 (explaining why various causes of action could not
be levied against an infant lessee).
84. Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223.
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lives and generations.”85 By renewing the lease in his own name and thereby
breaking the inter-generational chain of possession, the trustee frustrated the
very purpose of this trust.
Responding to these concerns, Chancellor King ordered the trustee to
hold all profits from the lease in a constructive trust for the infant.86 The
Chancellor acknowledged the extraordinary nature of his determination that
“the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might not have the lease.”87
Nonetheless, he stressed that “if a trustee, on the refusal to renew, might have
a lease to himself, few trust-estates would be renewed to cestui que use.”88
A general prohibition against conflicted transactions was necessary, in other
words, to guard against the likelihood that trustees would abuse their
positions of trust and confidence for their own gain at the beneficiaries’
expense.89
Despite its antiquated facts and terse reasoning, Keech continues to be
cited widely for the proposition that the fiduciary duty of loyalty operates as
a prophylaxis against harmful opportunism.90 Consistent with Chancellor
King’s reasoning, conventional wisdom holds that the no-conflict and noprofit rules are deliberately over-inclusive measures that deter fiduciaries
from engaging in opportunism.91 By prohibiting all self-interested
transactions and profit taking without a beneficiary’s informed consent—
regardless of a fiduciary’s intent and irrespective of whether the beneficiary
has suffered actual harm—fiduciary law eliminates a fiduciary’s incentives
to abuse her position for her own gain.92 The no-conflict and no-profit rules

85. Getzler, supra note 83, at 582.
86. Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223–24.
87. Id. at 223.
88. Id.
89. Pleadings in the case suggest that the trustee may have bribed the lessor to deny renewal to
the infant beneficiary in favor of the trustee. Joshua Getzler, “As If.” Accountability and
Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 973, 984 (2011).
90. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 121–22 (stating that, after Keech, the no-conflict rule
“developed into a clear principle of fiduciary doctrine”); ROTMAN, supra note 79, at 61–62; Getzler,
supra note 83, at 586 (describing Keech as “the fons et origo” of the doctrine prohibiting fiduciary
profit taking).
91. See, e.g., R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 111 (1st ed. 1975)
(asserting that Keech frames the duty of loyalty as a prophylactic rule that “imposes a duty to avoid
a situation of possible conflict between interest and duty”); T.G. Youdan, The Fiduciary Principle:
The Applicability of Proprietary Remedies, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 93, 105 (T.G.
Youdan ed., 1989) (arguing that the “twin policies of prophylaxis and of surmounting the evidence
problem may justify the finding of personal liability in a fiduciary where his gain is not shown to
correspond to any loss to the principal” (footnote omitted)).
92. See In re Primedia Inc. Derivative Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 262 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]he duty
of loyalty ‘does not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting
from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for
purposes of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from the breach
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also prevent a fiduciary from exploiting the fact that she “controls all
evidence of the relationship and can easily conceal wrongdoing from the
vulnerable party or the court.”93 Thus, Keech “has been received as
embodying a policy of prophylaxis, or preventative sanction through profit
stripping that takes away all incentive for a fiduciary to consider how he
might gain from his position.”94
Nearly two centuries after Keech, this theory of fiduciary law received
perhaps its most iconic expression in Bray v. Ford,95 an 1896 case from the
English House of Lords.96 The defendant in the case was the Vice-Chancellor
of Yorkshire College who was found to have violated his fiduciary duty by
simultaneously receiving payment for services rendered as the College’s
solicitor.97 In his opinion, Lord Herschell affirmed the “inflexible rule” that
a fiduciary may not “put himself in a position where his interest and duty
conflict.”98 Turning to the basis for this rule, Lord Herschell doubled down
on Chancellor King’s theory of the no-conflict and no-profit rules as a
prophylaxis against harmful opportunism:
It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded
upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the
consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in
such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being
swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those
whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed
expedient to lay down this positive rule. But I am satisfied that it
might be departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality,
without any wrong being inflicted, and without any consciousness of
wrong-doing.99
The idea that the duty of loyalty operates as a prophylaxis against
harmful opportunism also informed the early development of American
fiduciary law. In Davoue v. Fanning, “the foundational American case
recognizing and enforcing the then-recently-settled English [no-profit]
rule,”100 Chancellor Kent explained the rule as follows:
The cestuy que trust is not bound to prove, nor is the court bound to
judge, that the trustee has made a bargain advantageous to himself. . . .

of confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.’” (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939))).
93. Getzler, supra note 83, at 586.
94. Id.
95. Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Lord Herschell) (appeal taken from AC) (Eng.).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 51–52.
100. Langbein, supra note 77, at 944.
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There may be fraud, . . . and the party [may] not [be] able to prove it.
It is to guard against this uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and to
remove the trustee from temptation, that the rule does and will permit
the cestuy que trust to come, at his own option, and without showing
actual injury . . . . This is a remedy which goes deep, and touches the
very root of the evil.101
In sum, these three cases—Keech, Bray, and Davoue—demonstrate that
courts in the United Kingdom and the United States have defended the noconflict and no-profit rules from the very beginning as measures for
prophylactically protecting beneficiaries from harm. Courts recognized that
fiduciary power posed a serious risk of opportunism because many conflicted
transactions would, in fact, undercut beneficiaries’ interests, but that it would
often be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to discern after the fact
whether this was so in any particular case. Consistent with classical
liberalism, therefore, courts sought to explain and justify the no-conflict and
no-profit rules based primarily on concerns for safeguarding beneficiaries
from harmful interference.

C.

Classical Liberalism in Contemporary Fiduciary Theory

Legal scholars today continue to develop theories of fiduciary law that
reflect the normative commitments of classical liberalism. Some scholars
argue that fiduciary duties are designed to promote fidelity to a principal’s
choices.102 Others emphasize how fiduciary duties prevent harm to
beneficiaries’ material interests.103 What unites these two camps is the shared
assumption that the purpose of fiduciary law is to safeguard freedom from
interference.
Consider first the idea that fiduciary law promotes fidelity to a
principal’s choices. This vision of fiduciary law has been elaborated most
extensively in Matthew Conaglen’s monograph with the suggestive title
Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-fiduciary
Duties.104 Conaglen argues that fiduciary duties are “a subsidiary and
prophylactic form of protection for non-fiduciary duties”—principally, those
that arise via contract.105 In Conaglen’s view, the duty of loyalty’s
101. Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 261 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
102. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 202 (asserting that the proscriptive nature of
fiduciary duties indicates that they are concerned principally with “removing temptations, such as
inconsistent interests or duties, which have a tendency to sway the fiduciary away from proper
performance of . . . non-fiduciary duties”).
103. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047 (suggesting that fiduciary law serves to
protect principals against “two distinct forms of wrongdoing: first, the fiduciary may misappropriate
the principal’s asset or some of its value (an act of malfeasance); and second, the fiduciary may
neglect the asset’s management (an act of nonfeasance)”).
104. See generally CONAGLEN, supra note 5.
105. Id. at 4.
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proscriptive no-conflict and no-profit rules do not codify the requirements of
morality; fiduciaries may profit from unauthorized conflicted transactions in
a variety of contexts, he argues, without acting immorally.106 Nonetheless,
these rules are necessary as a practical matter, he argues, to prophylactically
eliminate temptations that might compromise a fiduciary’s faithful
performance of her assigned tasks.107
A second line of scholarship, which has been particularly influential in
the United States, seeks to explain and justify the fiduciary duty of loyalty
based on economic theory. Scholars of law and economics argue that the
fiduciary duty of loyalty protects beneficiaries from a classic “agency
problem”: the risk that a fiduciary will harm their interests by
misappropriating their assets or profit-making opportunities to their
detriment.108 Early economic theories of fiduciary law claimed that courts
used fiduciary duties as gap fillers for incomplete contracts to compensate
for parties’ inability to design contracts that completely specify their
respective obligations.109 Over time, scholars have refined this contractarian
account by characterizing fiduciary duties as “off-the-rack” or “standard
form” contractual default rules that protect unsophisticated parties, enhance
the efficiency of contract negotiation, and lower beneficiaries’ bonding and
monitoring costs.110 Fiduciary duties are good candidates to serve as default
rules, these scholars contend, because they are the kind of legal obligations

106. See id. at 106–41 (asserting that “a breach of fiduciary duty may be committed without the
fiduciary necessarily acting immorally”).
107. See id. at 39–40, 61–62 (using the no-conflict and no-profit principles to advance the
argument “that fiduciary doctrine is prophylactic in its very nature, as it is designed . . . to neutralise
influences likely to sway the fiduciary”); Smith, supra note 5, at 224 (“The rationale for [fiduciary
duties] is to prevent fiduciaries from breaching their mandates.”).
108. See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047 (applying “the principal-agent model
to the fiduciary relationship” and noting that “misappropriation . . . is governed by the duty of
loyalty”); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 197, 198–99, 201 (discussing how the “benefits [of a fiduciary]
come at the cost of being made vulnerable to abuse” and analyzing how the duty of loyalty lessens
that risk).
109. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the courts
impose fiduciary duties when “it is a reasonable inference that had the parties in advance negotiated
expressly over the issue they would have agreed that the agent owed the principal the high duty [of
loyalty]”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 426 (suggesting “that the duty of loyalty is a
response to the impossibility of writing contracts completely specifying the parties’ obligations”);
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991) (arguing
that “fiduciary duties should properly be seen as a method of gap-filling in incomplete contracts”).
110. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 26, at 11 (regarding fiduciary duties as consistent with
“an appropriate implied standard form provision that anticipates what the parties would have drafted
if they had focused on the situation”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 426–27 (arguing that
fiduciary duties lower transaction, monitoring, and specification costs); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky
Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 387 (2007) (describing
corporate law as “a convenient set of off-the-rack rules that help solve problems”).
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that a sophisticated party would demand whenever they repose special trust
and confidence in another.111 By making fiduciary duties default rules,
fiduciary law also minimizes information costs to third parties, such as
creditors, who transact with a fiduciary.112
Scholars who apply economic theory to fiduciary law tend to agree with
Conaglen that the no-conflict and no-profit rules are over inclusive, because
they deter fiduciaries from pursing some self-interested transactions that
would actually promote their beneficiaries’ best interests.113 Nonetheless,
they argue that the “prophylactic” character of these rules is a necessary
response to the significant information asymmetries between fiduciaries,
beneficiaries, and the judiciary.114 Thus, in contrast to Conaglen, who
focuses on respecting a principal’s choices, scholars of law and economics
emphasize the duty of loyalty’s deterrent and protective function in
preventing fiduciaries from harming beneficiaries’ material interests.
Despite their different points of departure, these two accounts of
fiduciary law both approach the duty of loyalty from a classical liberal
perspective. Both assume that fiduciary duties are concerned exclusively
with safeguarding parties’ freedom from interference. Both characterize the
no-conflict and no-profit rules as “over inclusive” because the rules may
deter fiduciaries from pursuing some desirable transactions.115 Accordingly,
both endorse Lord Herschell’s suggestion that the no-conflict and no-profit

111. See Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 280–81 (1998) (classifying standard
fiduciary rules as “default mechanism[s]” and arguing that “fashioning a [fiduciary] rule that
replicates (at least functionally) the allocation that the parties themselves would have bargained for
ex ante . . . should be an important goal of the courts”).
112. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1678 (1989) (arguing that “standardization of
contract terms through the use of mandatory legal rules reduces information costs for investors”);
Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 205 (concluding that fiduciary obligations “minimize third-party
information costs”).
113. See, e.g., GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed. rev. 1993) (“The principal object of the [no-profit] rule is
preventative . . . .”); Langbein, supra note 77, at 932–33 (arguing that the no-conflict rule results in
overdeterrence); Sitkoff, supra note 109, at 201 (“[T]he functional core of fiduciary obligations is
deterrence.”).
114. See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1048 (“Because a fiduciary’s
misappropriation is profitable and difficult to prove, it is appropriate for fiduciary law to infer
disloyalty from its appearance.”); Talley, supra note 111, at 282 (arguing that fiduciary law’s
prophylactic rules are justifiable on the basis that “an optimal legal rule in a private-information
environment may consciously permit some inefficiencies in order to obviate even greater efficiency
losses”); Youdan, supra note 91, at 105 (arguing that the “twin policies of prophylaxis and of
surmounting the evidence problem may justify the finding of personal liability in a fiduciary where
his gain is not shown to correspond to any loss to the principal” (footnote omitted)).
115. See Talley, supra note 111, at 282 (noting that “the optimal legal rule will tend . . . to be
over-inclusive”); cf. CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 68 (discussing how fiduciary duties can “capture
situations in which no true wrong has been committed”).
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rules “might be departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality,
without any wrong being inflicted, and without any consciousness of wrongdoing.”116 At the end of the day, however, both accounts accept that the
traditional duty of loyalty is necessary as a prophylactic measure to minimize
the serious risks of harm that arise within fiduciary relationships.117
D.

Challenges to the Classical Liberal Theory

Despite classical liberalism’s many virtues as an interpretive theory of
fiduciary law, it is not a natural fit with traditional fiduciary rules and
remedies. Some key features of fiduciary relationships run at cross-purposes
with the ideal of freedom as noninterference, including the discretionary
authority that fiduciaries often exercise over their principals’ interests. There
are also good reasons to question whether the inflexible no-conflict and noprofit rules offer an optimal strategy for combatting harmful opportunism.
Moreover, the traditional fiduciary remedies of constructive trust and
disgorgement do not track the optimal deterrence conception of fiduciary
loyalty. For these and other reasons, it is unlikely that classical liberalism
can offer a complete justification for the traditional duty of loyalty with its
associated remedies.
Under classical liberalism, any form of interference in matters of
personal choice constitutes a threat to freedom.118 Yet fiduciary law entrusts
many fiduciaries—including guardians and investment managers—with
broad discretionary powers to make decisions for and on behalf of their
principals.119 These fiduciaries are not charged solely with carrying their
principals’ choices into execution; instead, they make choices for their
principals and beneficiaries.120 Indeed, it is no great exaggeration to say that
a fiduciary’s intercession in her principal’s domain of personal choice is the
entire raison d’être for these categories of fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary
decision making might be less problematic from a classical liberal
perspective when it occurs with a principal’s informed consent. Some
fiduciary relationships, however, are established by legislation, judicial
decree, or unilateral undertaking, rather than through the parties’ voluntary

116. Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Lord Herschell) (appeal taken from AC) (Eng.).
117. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 70–71 (asserting that the purpose of fiduciary doctrine is
to “provide prophylactic protection” to minimize harm); Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 1049 (declaring
that “the law requires the fiduciary to be other-regarding” and elaborating that “[w]hat is meant by
other-regarding is defined by default fiduciary duties of loyalty”).
118. See supra subpart II(A).
119. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 42–53 (examining traditional examples of fiduciary
relationships and the responsibilities and discretion in each).
120. Id.
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choice.121 These relationships sidestep a principal’s decision making by
placing her interests under another’s power without her consent. They also
impose legal duties that constrain the fiduciary’s choices.122 The best
argument for these choice-constraining features of fiduciary law, from the
perspective of classical liberalism, may be that they are default rules that
correspond to the hypothetical bargain that a reasonable fiduciary would
make with her principal. As this Article explains in Part III, however, the
triggering conditions and terms of this “hypothetical bargain” are best
understood as reflecting republican concerns about fiduciaries’ capacity for
arbitrary interference, rather than the classical liberal ideal of freedom from
interference.
Just as classical liberalism struggles to explain fiduciary authority and
fiduciary duties, there are good reasons to reject the classical liberal thesis
that optimal deterrence can fully explain or justify the duty of loyalty with its
associated remedies. Economic theory suggests that successful deterrence
depends upon the expected sanction equaling or exceeding the expected gain
from a fiduciary’s indiscretions.123 However, the expected value of
unauthorized conflicted transactions will always exceed the expected value
of disgorged assets. The reasons for this are obvious. Some beneficiaries
will never become aware that their fiduciary has engaged in self-dealing.
Others will lack a sufficient stake in the matter to justify incurring litigation
costs, or they will decline to pursue judicial relief for idiosyncratic personal
reasons. As long as the probability of effective judicial enforcement is less
than 100%, the traditional fiduciary remedies of rescission, constructive trust,
and disgorgement will fail systematically to deter harmful opportunism ex
ante.124 Thus, if the no-profit rule were designed as a deterrence mechanism,
we would expect it to be backed by harsher penalties than rescission,
constructive trust, and disgorgement.
More troubling still, it is unclear as a purely empirical matter whether
the no-conflict and no-profit rules actually promote beneficiaries’ material
interests. Some legal scholars have speculated that these rules are more likely
to harm beneficiaries’ interests overall by deterring loyal fiduciaries from
121. See Walter G. Hart, The Development of the Rule in Keech v. Sandford, 21 L.Q. REV. 258,
258 (1905) (observing that “a vendor of land is [deemed by law] to be a constructive trustee for the
purchaser” between contract formation and conveyance); Miller, supra note 2, at 982 n.37 (citing
as examples the relationships between parents and children and between a trustee and beneficiary
of a declaratory trust).
122. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 101–77 (examining the duties of fiduciaries, including the
duties of care and loyalty).
123. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment,
24 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 91 (1984) (“An individual will engage in [an] activity if his private gain
exceeds the expected sanction.”).
124. See Lionel Smith, Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations, 7 J.
EQUITY 87, 91 (2013).
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concluding profit-enhancing (or loss-minimizing) transactions.125 Although
the no-conflict and no-profit rules may prevent some self-dealing, critics
have argued that it “also reduces—and in all likelihood to a greater extent—
the number of instances in which fiduciaries who are inclined to act loyally
can act on their inclinations.”126 Extending this argument, it is possible that
the no-conflict and no-profit rules might also frustrate the “due performance
of non-fiduciary duties” in some settings by deterring fiduciaries from
pursuing transactions that would best satisfy their principals’ instructions.
John Langbein has pursued this critique of the no-conflict and no-profit
rules with particular vigor.127 Langbein characterizes the no-conflict rule as
“Bleak House law, born of the [English Chancery Court’s] despair” over its
inability to distinguish faithful trust administration from fraud.128
Today, by contrast, in the wake of fusion and the reform of civil
procedure, courts dealing with equity cases command effective factfinding procedures.129
Accordingly, much of the concern voiced by [Chancellor Kent and
others]—that without the [no-conflict] rule the beneficiary would be
“not able to prove” trustee misbehavior—is archaic.130
In Langbein’s view, therefore, the duty of loyalty’s “prophylactic” rules
are no longer necessary to protect beneficiaries from fiduciary opportunism
and may actually harm beneficiaries’ interests by taking desirable conflicted
transactions off the table.
One final critique of the classical liberal theory of fiduciary law merits
brief consideration. As other scholars have noted, there is a fundamental
conceptual mismatch between classical liberalism’s conception of the noprofit rule as a prophylactic deterrent measure and the paradigmatic remedies
for unauthorized profits: constructive trust and disgorgement.131
125. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 77, at 988 (arguing that the present formulation of fiduciary
loyalty forsakes the underlying purpose of the duty by ignoring that conflicted transactions
sometimes advance a beneficiary’s best interest).
126. Smith, supra note 5, at 126 n.15. Melanie Leslie argues that this concern is vastly
overstated because fiduciaries would decline to pursue conflicted transactions only in the
exceedingly rare cases where the costs of obtaining beneficiaries’ informed consent would outweigh
the expected gains. See Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response
to Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 550 (2005).
127. See Langbein, supra note 77, at 951–52 (arguing that the rules result in “overdeterrence”—
“[b]y penalizing trustees in cases in which the interest of the trust beneficiary was unharmed or
advanced, the rule deters future trustees from similar, beneficiary-regarding conduct”).
128. Id. at 947.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of
Judgement on Behalf of Another, 130 L.Q. REV. 608, 625–31 (2014) (explaining that viewing the
no-profit rule as prophylactic is incompatible with the theories behind constructive trusts and
disgorgement).
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Traditionally speaking, courts have conceptualized disgorgement as a
restitutionary remedy rather than a punitive remedy.132 The purpose of
disgorgement is simply to effectuate the return of assets that have been
wrongfully withheld.133 Constructive trust likewise applies when a party has
been “unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to identifiable property at
the expense of the claimant or in violation of the claimant’s rights.”134 Under
the classical liberal theory, however, it is unclear why profits generated by
conflicted transactions or misappropriated business opportunities would
belong, strictly speaking, to beneficiaries rather than to the public fisc. That
a beneficiary may suffer harm from the opportunism that generates fiduciary
profits is self-evident. Yet compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
criminal sanctions would seem to be the appropriate remedies to make a
beneficiary whole and deter future indiscretions—not constructive trust and
disgorgement.135 Taking classical liberalism seriously would therefore
require an extreme makeover of fiduciary duties and remedies.
E.

Classical Liberalism’s Challenge to Fiduciary Law

These lessons have not been lost on legal scholars, legislators, and
judges in the United States. As the mismatch between classical liberalism’s
normative commitments and fiduciary law’s rules and remedies has become
increasingly apparent, some legal scholars, judges, and legislators have taken
steps to reshape American fiduciary law in the image of classical liberalism.
Over the past several decades, classical liberal thinking has profoundly
shaped the fiduciary law of business organizations, as state legislatures and
courts have dismantled key features of the duty of loyalty. For example,
under the latest formulation of the Delaware Supreme Court’s “entire
fairness” test, corporate directors may authorize self-dealing transactions
without obtaining informed consent from either the disinterested directors or
the corporation’s shareholders, as long as they can convince courts after the
fact that the transactions were substantially fair.136 Moreover, when a court

132. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining
that disgorgement “may not be used punitively”).
133. See id. (“[D]isgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment.”).
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2011).
135. See, e.g., Bardis v. Oates, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 100–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (awarding
compensatory and punitive damages, recognizing the availability of disgorgement, and noting the
availability of substantial criminal penalties for breach of fiduciary duty). Conaglen has argued that
disgorgement can be rehabilitated as a fiduciary remedy if it is conceptualized as a purely
prophylactic measure. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 76. As Lionel Smith has explained,
however, Conaglen’s theory still raises the over-inclusivity and under-inclusivity concerns
associated with deterrence accounts. See Smith, supra note 124, at 93, 95.
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2017); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,
1376 (Del. 1993) (defining the aspects of the entire fairness test as applied to breaches of fiduciary
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in Delaware determines that a conflicted transaction violates the entire
fairness test, “the remedy is the difference between the fair value determined
by the court and the value actually conveyed” (consistent with classical
liberalism), rather than full disgorgement of all profits (as required under the
traditional no-profit rule).137 These departures from the traditional duty of
loyalty resonate with the classical liberal view that state intervention in the
private sphere is warranted only to the extent that it is absolutely necessary
to prevent officers and directors from harming a corporation’s material
interests.
Drawing inspiration from Delaware corporate law, Langbein has argued
that trust law’s no-conflict and no-profit rules should also be reframed as a
rebuttable presumption.138
Under Langbein’s proposed approach,
unauthorized conflicted transactions would not be subject to rescission,
constructive trust, or disgorgement if a trustee can establish that the
transactions promoted her beneficiaries’ best interests relative to other
available opportunities.139 Implicit in this proposal is a simple premise: there
is nothing inherently immoral about a fiduciary profiting from a conflicted
transaction, provided that the transaction also increases the beneficiaries’
profits (or minimizes losses) relative to other opportunities. After all, why
should courts demand that fiduciaries act in the sole interest of their
beneficiaries if a conflicted transaction would inarguably promote the
beneficiaries’ best interests? Taking the normative commitments of classical
liberalism at face value, it is hard to see why courts must apply the no-conflict
and no-profit rules with “[u]ncompromising rigidity.”140
Recent developments suggest that Langbein’s critique of the no-conflict
and no-profit rules is gaining traction at the state level. For example, the
Model Business Corporation Act and the Uniform Business Organizations
Code have been revised in recent years to allow fiduciaries to conclude
conflicted transactions without their beneficiaries’ approval if they can

duty); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (explaining the entire fairness test
as an overall look at whether the transaction met the aspects of fair dealing and fair price, and which
factors play into that determination).
137. D. Gordon Smith, Fiduciary Law and Entrepreneurial Action 3 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author); see also Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, Inc., 766 A.2d 437, 440–42 (Del.
2000) (explaining that in a merger action, the court must appraise the actual value of the shares in
determining damages); In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *44–46 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (explaining that the damages awarded in a breach of fiduciary duty case can be
determined by the difference between the fair value of the shares as determined by the court and the
value actually conveyed for said shares).
138. Langbein, supra note 77, at 931–33.
139. Id.
140. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). But see Leslie, supra note 7, at 72
(arguing that Langbein’s approach “would strike a fatal blow to the duty of loyalty as a moral norm,
and would thus increase instances of trustee opportunism, at least at the margins”).
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convince courts that the conflicted transactions were objectively “fair.”141
The Uniform Trust Code likewise no longer presumes that a trustee who
purchases investments from related entities has violated her duty of
loyalty.142 Although transactions between a trustee and her relatives, agents,
and other close associates are “presumed to be affected by a conflict between
personal and fiduciary interests,”143 this presumption can be rebutted “if the
trustee establishes that the transaction was not affected by a conflict between
personal and fiduciary interests.”144 Similarly, the Uniform Power of
Attorney Act and the Uniform Probate Code no longer apply the no-conflict
rule to principal–agent relationships.145 Dozens of states and the District of
Columbia have embraced these changes, implicitly endorsing the classical
liberal idea that if beneficiaries have suffered “no harm” there is “no foul”
requiring judicial relief.146 As long as a fiduciary has acted “with care,
competence, and diligence for the best interest of the [beneficiary],” the
thinking goes that the beneficiary has no cause to complain.147
The classical liberal theory of fiduciary loyalty is also beginning to
shape federal law. Over the past year, the fiduciary status of investment
advisers has become a topic of heated political debate following the
Department of Labor’s (DOL) promulgation of a final rule designating
certain retirement investment advisers as fiduciaries (the “Fiduciary
Rule”).148 Under intense lobbying from the financial services community,
majorities of both houses of Congress voted to revoke the Fiduciary Rule in
2016, only to see the measure vetoed by President Barack Obama.149 Several

141. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61(b)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005) (providing that
conflicted transactions need “to have been fair to the corporation”); UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 8-507
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (providing that a conflicted transaction is not voidable if “the covered
party shows that the transaction is fair to the trust”).
142. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(f) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Commentary accompanying
this provision states that it “creates an exception to the [no-conflict and no-profit rules] for trustee
investment in mutual funds.” Id. § 802 cmt.
143. Id. § 802(c).
144. Id. § 802 cmt.
145. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5B-114(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT
§ 144(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–.06
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (retaining the traditional no-conflict rule).
146. On business organizations, see, for example, 7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-108-501(2)(c)
(2016); 29 D.C. CODE § 29-1205.07 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13–C § 872(2)(C) (2016); 47
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-861.1(3) (2007). On principal–agent relationships, see, for example,
ARK. CODE ANN. 28-68-114(d) (West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 49A-114(d) (West 2014);
13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.34(D) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1612(D) (2012).
147. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(d).
148. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,997 (Apr. 8, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21 (2016))
[hereinafter Fiduciary Rule].
149. See Tammy Duckworth, Opinion, Isn’t Honesty the Best Policy?, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/11/opinion/isnt-honesty-the-best-policy.html?_r=0
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lawsuits were later filed against DOL,150 including one in which the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and other industry groups sought to prevent the
Fiduciary Rule’s enforcement on the grounds that the rule creates
“unwarranted burdens and liabilities” for financial advisers.151 To date, none
of these legal challenges to the Fiduciary Rule have been successful.152 In
the meantime, however, congressional Republicans introduced a bill to delay
the Fiduciary Rule’s effective date for two years.153 Incoming President
Donald Trump also issued a memorandum, instructing DOL to review the
Fiduciary Rule for possible revision or rescission.154 White House
representatives and some congressional leaders defended the President’s
move, arguing that reconsideration was justified because in their view the
Fiduciary Rule threatened to limit the investment choices available to
retirement investors and increase management costs.155 Although this
[https://perma.cc/68DM-TKGF] (stating “Republican majorities in the House and Senate pushed
through a bill to block the Department of Labor’s rule. On Wednesday [June 8th, 2016], President
Obama rightly vetoed it.”).
150. See Jacklyn Wille, Labor Department Faces Five Lawsuits Over Fiduciary Rule,
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 9, 2016), https://www.bna.com/labor-department-faces-n57982073912/
[https://perma.cc/K5YT-FGED] (describing lawsuits).
151. Complaint at 2, Chamber of Commerce v. Perez, No. 16-cv-1476 (N.D. Tex. June 1,
2016), http://www.financialservices.org/uploadedFiles/FSI _Content/Advocacy_Action_Center
/DOL/DOL-Fiduciary-Rule-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K2T-4N92].
152. Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, No. 16-cv-1476, 2017 WL 514424, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 8, 2017).
153. See David Trainer, The Truth Behind the Push To Delay Fiduciary Rule, FORBES (Jan. 17,
2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/01/17/the-truth-behind-push-to-delayfiduciary-rule/#c9cc79d4b100 [https://perma.cc/6LVH-E98L] (discussing the bill introduced by
Representative Joe Wilson and providing a link to it).
154. Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule, Memorandum for the Secretary of
Labor § 1(b) (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidentialmemorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule
[https://perma.cc/MQ8U-X3GY]
[hereinafter
TRUMP
MEMORANDUM]. At the time of this writing, the press has reported that the President intends to
take action to delay implementation of the Fiduciary Rule to facilitate this review. See The Trump
Administration Reportedly Plans To Delay the ‘Fiduciary’ Rule for 180 Days, FORTUNE (Feb. 10,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/10/trump-administration-labor-department-fiduciary-rule-delay/
[https://perma.cc/3PH5-8BNS] (discussing these developments).
155. See Press Release, House Fin. Servs. Comm., Statement from Hensarling and Wagner on
President Trump’s Action to Delay Harmful Fiduciary Rule (Feb. 3, 2017),
http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=401458
[https://perma.cc/LG8C-NWPB] (quoting Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling
as claiming that eliminating the Fiduciary Rule would “empower Americans to make their own
financial decisions” and lower management costs for retirement investors); Jonnelle Marte, Trump
Calls for Review of Long-Awaited Rule Meant To Protect Retirement Savers, WASH. POST (Feb. 3,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2017/02/03/trump-to-target-longawaited-rule-meant-to-protect-retirement-savers/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.6206b3a7ee55
[https://perma.cc/P7EC-2FX5] (citing comments of White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer that
the rule would have limited the amount of financial services available to the public); Press Release,
White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Executive Order
(Feb.
3,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-presson
Fiduciary
Rule
office/2017/02/03/remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-order-fiduciary-rule
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characterization of the Fiduciary Rule’s impact is controversial, to say the
least,156 the critical point for present purposes is what it reveals about the
terms of contemporary debates over fiduciary loyalty. Without exception,
critics of the Fiduciary Rule presume that classical liberal values—investor
choice and private wealth maximization—are the only relevant normative
considerations.
Some fiduciary law scholars in the United States have expressed
consternation about the growing movement to rein in the fiduciary duty of
loyalty.157 By and large, however, they have defended fiduciary law’s
traditional rules and remedies without challenging the normative
commitments of classical liberalism.158 Consequently, debates over the
wisdom of preserving and extending fiduciary law’s no-conflict and no-profit
rules have become mired in empirically contested claims about whether
fiduciary duties and remedies optimally deter opportunism.159 The
republican tradition offers a more promising theoretical foundation for
explaining, justifying, and defending fiduciary law’s conventional rules and
remedies. To build upon this foundation, however, courts and policy makers
will have to set aside some cherished myths about the purpose and function
of fiduciary duties, including Chancellor King’s oft-repeated dictum that the
duty of loyalty is an over-inclusive prophylactic rule. In the discussion that
follows, this Article shows how the republican theory of fiduciary law
furnishes an interpretively compelling alternative to classical liberalism. The
republican theory supports the traditional features of fiduciary loyalty,
including the proscriptive no-conflict and no-profit rules, and it justifies
fiduciary law’s distinctive remedies.

[https://perma.cc/QV2Y-ZX7K] (quoting Representative Ann Wagner’s comment: “What we’re
doing is we are returning to the American people . . . their control of their own retirement
savings”).
156. Contrary to the protestations of its critics, the Fiduciary Rule does not limit investor choice
in any meaningful sense; it merely requires investment advisers to obtain investors’ informed
consent to particular conflicts of interest. See generally Fiduciary Rule, supra note 148. Supporters
observe, moreover, that the Rule promotes investors’ interests because “conflicted advice” from
retirement-investment advisers “lowers investors’ returns by as much as 1 percentage point a year—
a loss of $17 billion annually for IRA investors alone.” Eileen Ambrose, New Rules to Improve
Retirement Investing, AARP BULL., May 2016, http://www.aarp.org/money/investing/info2016/rules-protect-retirement-investments.html [https://perma.cc/S3LF-PS2T] (citing figures from
the White House Council of Economic Advisers).
157. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and
Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2742–43 (2006) (arguing that modifying or eliminating
fiduciary rules undermines beneficiaries’ interests).
158. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 126, at 544 (challenging amendments to the Uniform Trust
Code on the grounds that they would harm future beneficiaries rather than challenging classical
liberalism itself).
159. Compare Langbein, supra note 77, at 940–41 (arguing that some traditional fiduciary rules
and remedies were suboptimal in the context of trust law), with Leslie, supra note 7, at 70–71
(defending traditional fiduciary rules and remedies).
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III. A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law
Unlike classical liberalism, republicanism persuasively explains and
justifies the traditional features of contemporary fiduciary law. As this Part
will show, the juridical structure of American fiduciary law reflects
republican principles, from the idea that “breach of trust” constitutes a
distinctive legal wrong160 to courts’ reliance on equitable remedies that are
calibrated precisely to neutralize domination.161
Although classical
liberalism has chipped away at traditional fiduciary rules and remedies over
the past several decades—particularly with respect to the fiduciary duties of
business associations162—American fiduciary law as a whole continues to
reflect republicanism’s normative commitment to freedom from domination.
Republican themes also appear in contemporary fiduciary law
scholarship. As fiduciary legal theory has matured in recent years, some
theorists have pushed back against classical liberalism, arguing that fiduciary
duties cannot be fully apprehended from the perspective of preventing
harmful interference. Some have suggested that fiduciary duties and
remedies reflect formal juridical features of fiduciary relationships.163 Others
have emphasized the need to protect vulnerable parties from subjection to
fiduciaries’ unilateral power.164
Still others have emphasized the

160. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16440 (West 2005) (describing a trustee’s violation of the
duty of loyalty as a “breach of trust”); United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910)
(emphasizing that if a fiduciary “acquires any interest adverse to his principal without a full
disclosure, it is” actionable as “a betrayal of his trust and a breach of confidence”); Pure Power Boot
Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 489, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(emphasizing the betrayal of trust in fiduciary disloyalty).
161. See, e.g., Lewis v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 2016 WL 3676099, at *6–7 (D.D.C.
July 6, 2016) (affirming disgorgement as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty); In re Opus East
LLC, 528 B.R. 30, 106–07 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (emphasizing that constructive trust is an
appropriate remedy for breach of fiduciary duty); Holliday v. Weaver, 2016 WL 3660261, at *2
(mem. op.) (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.) (“Where there has been a clear and serious violation
of a fiduciary duty, equity dictates not only that the fiduciary disgorge his fees, but also all benefit
obtained from use of those fees.”).
162. See supra notes 136–37, 141–47 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 6, at 63, 67 (noting that “fiduciary duties have historically been ‘necessarily referable to
a relationship’”); Lionel D. Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 141, 141–42 (discussing the idea that the legal requirement of
loyalty should not be called a duty).
164. See, e.g., ROTMAN, supra note 79, at 84 (analyzing Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99,
99 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting)); Deborah A. DeMott, Essay, Relationships of Trust and
Confidence in the Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1259–60 (2015) (commenting that
fiduciary relationships “require or engender trust by the beneficiary with a correlative potential for
abuse by the fiduciary, often . . . effected through deceptive or disingenuous means”); Smith, supra
note 64, at 1483 (noting that “[t]he law provides protection against opportunistic behavior, and the
strength of that protection varies inversely with the potential for self-help on the part of the
vulnerable party”); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4–5 (1975)
(“The wide leeway afforded to the fiduciary to affect the legal position of the principal in effect puts
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“entrustment” of other-regarding power as a defining feature of fiduciary
relationships.165 Each of these contributions gestures toward a republican
theory in which fiduciary duties and remedies are calculated to safeguard
parties’ freedom from domination. Nonetheless, the fact that judges and
private law scholars have not expressly connected fiduciary law to
republicanism’s distinctive conception of legal order has impeded previous
efforts to develop a coherent interpretive theory of fiduciary law.
This Part shows how republicanism can explain fiduciary law’s
traditional duties and remedies while also supplying a robust normative
justification for these features. The republican theory furnishes answers to
some of the most important and controversial questions in fiduciary theory
today, including: (A) the normative foundations of fiduciary law; (B) the
distinguishing features of fiduciary relationships; (C) the requirements of
fiduciary loyalty; (D) the theoretical basis for fiduciary law’s traditional
remedies; and (E) the theoretical basis for fiduciary law’s divergent conduct
and decision rules. Taking a step back, however, the republican theory’s
most important contribution may be to situate fiduciary law within a rich
philosophical account of the relationship between public institutions, private
relationships, and private law.166 As this Part will show, private fiduciary
theory has much to learn from public law theory. Whereas private law theory
has underscored the interpersonal nature of fiduciary relationships and has
provided the most granular analysis of the duty of loyalty’s applications,
public law theory offers the sharpest account of what it means to hold a
fiduciary office properly, which is to say, subject to republican norms of
nondomination.167
A.

The Normative Foundations of Fiduciary Law

The republican theory posits that fiduciary law empowers principals,
while also emancipating principals, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries alike from
domination. Fiduciary law is concerned not merely with promoting the
performance of non-fiduciary obligations or preventing material harm, as

the latter at the mercy of the former, and necessitates the existence of a legal device which will
induce the fiduciary to use his power beneficently.”).
165. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 4–6; see also J. C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 35
(1981) (describing as essential to a fiduciary relationship the acquisition and use of power by one
person on the condition that it be used in the best interests of another); Matthew Harding, Trust and
Fiduciary Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 82–87 (2013) (arguing that “thick” trust, which is
characterized by the entrustment of discretionary power, characterizes some types of fiduciary
relationships).
166. Whether fiduciary duties can successfully eliminate domination in practice depends, of
course, on whether they are implemented through legal and political institutions that are congenial
to nondomination. This Article discusses some implications of this challenge in subpart III(E)
below.
167. I am grateful to Evan Fox-Decent for suggesting this formulation.
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some theorists have assumed. Rather, it secures freedom from domination
by affirming that all people are sui juris—free and equal agents whose legal
and practical interests are entitled to respect.
1. Empowerment.—Fiduciary law empowers principals in several
different ways. First, it enables principals to extend their agency through
fiduciaries who exercise legal powers and assert legal rights on their
behalf.168 A principal may decide to entrust a fiduciary with authority to
conclude transactions on her behalf with third parties (agency);169 manage
and distribute her assets upon her death (testamentary trusts);170 distribute her
assets to unspecified third parties for charitable purposes (charitable
trusts);171 participate in a commercial enterprise (corporations);172 or tend to
the physical, emotional, educational, and religious upbringing of her children
(guardianship).173 In each of these settings, fiduciary law makes vicarious
representation possible by empowering a principal to authorize another party
to exercise legal rights and assume obligations on her behalf.
Fiduciary law also empowers principals in situations where they lack
the legal or practical capacity to designate a fiduciary to act on their behalf.
For example, children generally lack legal capacity to assert their own legal
rights, and they are unable to designate an adult to exercise these rights on
their behalf.174 Fiduciary law addresses this dilemma by providing legal
mechanisms whereby adults (e.g., guardians) are assigned to serve as
fiduciaries until children reach adulthood.175 Consider also how fiduciary

168. Cf. Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 761 (2016) (arguing
that contract law “aims to empower people to use promises as tools to influence one another’s
actions and thereby to meet a broad range of human needs and interests”).
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, §§ 2.01–2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (defining a trust as a
category of fiduciary relationships); id. § 17 (discussing the creation of testamentary trusts).
171. See id. § 28 (listing the purposes for which a charitable trust may be established as such).
172. See Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebellum Political Culture,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1894 (1989) [hereinafter Incorporating the Republic] (quoting John
Quincy Adams’s 1832 defense of the corporation as a “truly republican institution” that enabled
broad participation in capitalist enterprise in a society where “[v]ery few, scarcely any, individuals
had command of wealth and credit competent to the formation of [manufacturing] establishments”
(quoting 8 CONG. DEB. app. at 84 (1832) (statement of John Quincy Adams))).
173. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-202(1) (2017) (“A guardian may be appointed by
will or other signed writing by a parent for any minor child the parent has or may have in the
future.”).
174. See Frederic B. Rodgers, Court-Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 JUDGES’ J., Winter
2001, at 22, 23 (“Children lack legal capacity to sue and be sued, and courts have the power to
appoint a guardian or next friend to defend their interests in civil suits.”).
175. See id. It may seem counterintuitive to characterize fiduciary law as “empowering”
children, given that the law does not ordinarily require guardians to follow the choices of children
under their care. Children would be disempowered indeed, however, if their guardians lacked the
capacity to serve as fiduciary representatives to exercise their legal rights on the children’s behalf.
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law responds when a ship runs aground, imperiling cargo that does not belong
to the shipmaster. Although shipmasters do not ordinarily have contractual
relationships with cargo owners, courts have held that shipmasters who are
unable to communicate with cargo owners may sometimes sell the cargo to a
third party, acting as an agent of necessity for the cargo owners, in order to
protect the goods’ value.176 In such cases, fiduciary law empowers principals
by ensuring that their legal rights can be exercised on their behalf even when
they lack the legal or practical capacity to select their own fiduciary.
In other settings, fiduciary law empowers private parties by enabling
them to benefit from the exercise of legal powers that they do not
independently possess. For example, when multiple investors commit assets
to a pooled investment fund, each retains an equitable interest in the profits
generated by the fund, but no particular investor has the right to decide
unilaterally how the fund will be distributed.177 Accordingly, when an
investment manager winds up a pooled fund and distributes assets, she
exercises a power that none of the contributing investors can claim
independently. Although the investment manager’s authority to resolve
investors’ competing claims to pooled funds is called into existence by
investors’ mutual consent, it is not derived from investors’ independent legal
powers; instead, it is constituted and regulated by fiduciary law itself.178
Similarly, when parties appoint an arbitrator to resolve a dispute, the
arbitrator exercises a legal power that neither party would have the right to
exercise independently under the general principle that no private party is
authorized to serve as judge and party to the same cause (nemo iudex in sua
causa).179 Like the investment manager for a pooled fund, an arbitrator’s
authority to resolve disputes is called into existence by the parties’ common
consent, but it involves the exercise of a power that private parties do not

176. See, e.g., The “Gratitudine” (1801) 165 Eng. Rep. 450, 455–56; 3 C. Rob. 240, 255–58
(holding that a shipmaster may pledge cargo as collateral to finance the ship’s repairs “in cases of
instant and unforeseen and unprovided [sic] necessity,” where “the character of agent [of the cargo’s
owner] . . . is forced upon [the shipmaster]”); Australasian Steam Navigation Co. v Morse [1872] 8
Moore PC (NSW) 482, 491–92 (Austl.) (holding same, provided the communication with the cargo
owner is impossible); China Pacific SA v. Food Corp. of India [1981] 3 All ER 688 (HL) 693 (Lord
Diplock) (appeal taken from AC) (Eng.); see generally CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at
132–34 (discussing fiduciary duties in the context of emergencies).
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (providing for the
termination of a trust if all beneficiaries consent); id. § 79 (providing that the trustee of a pooled
investment has a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust that governs the trustee’s investments, not a
duty to any one particular investor).
178. See id. § 90 cmt. a (noting that trustees have a duty to “preserve the trust property . . . and
to make it productive,” but failing to enumerate duties to a particular investor).
179. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428 (1995) (characterizing this
principle as “a mainstay of our system of government”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
(1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (identifying “certain vital principles in our free Republican
governments,” including the prohibition against “a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause”).
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independently possess.180 This power to arbitrate among the rivalrous claims
of multiple beneficiaries is quintessentially fiduciary in nature.181
Fiduciary law thus reflects an implicit normative commitment to
individual empowerment. By allowing principals to designate fiduciaries to
act on their behalf, fiduciary law empowers beneficiaries to accomplish
purposes that they could not achieve as easily—or could not achieve at all,
legally or practically speaking—without a fiduciary’s assistance. This
commitment to individual empowerment is consistent with republicanism’s
respect for individual agency182 as long as it does not compromise others’
equal freedom.183
Fiduciary law also empowers fiduciaries but in a very different way than
it empowers principals. It empowers fiduciaries in the limited sense that they
receive authorization to exercise legal rights that they would not otherwise
be entitled to exercise in their personal capacity. Fiduciary law authorizes a
fiduciary to exercise fiduciary power solely in an institutional or official
capacity—as holder of an office that is constituted and regulated by law—for
a prescribed, other-regarding purpose.184 Fiduciary power is categorically
different from principals’ power because fiduciaries are not free to pursue
their own ends; a constitutive feature of fiduciary power is that the law
permits its exercise only in a manner that is faithful to the fiduciary’s mandate
and solicitous of beneficiaries’ legal and practical interests.185 Fiduciary law
thus confers power on fiduciaries to act in a manner that affects others’ legal

180. See James Allsop, The Authority of the Arbitrator, 30 ARB. INT’L 639, 648 (2014)
(describing the power of the arbitrator, which, while derived from the agreement of the parties,
necessarily encompasses authority the parties themselves do not have, such as the power to
determine the parties’ rights in the dispute).
181. See Atkins v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 694 F.3d 557, 569 (5th
Cir. 2012) (explaining that “a trustee deadlock over [the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)] eligibility matters . . . must be submitted to [an arbitrator as fiduciary]” (quoting
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 338 (1981)); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY OP. 7966A, at 1–3 (Sept. 14, 1979) (concluding that an arbitrator who decides the question of a
participant’s entitlement to ERISA plan benefits acts as a fiduciary); cf. Leib et al., supra note 17,
at 718–19 (arguing that the judicial office should be understood as a public trust).
182. A commitment to individual empowerment is not unique to republicanism. This feature
of fiduciary law is compatible with classical liberalism and a variety of other normative theories.
183. Republicanism thus supports liberty-reinforcing constraints on individual empowerment,
including reasonable antitrust regulations. See Incorporating the Republic, supra note 172, at 1893–
902 (discussing nineteenth-century debates over whether the corporation, “with its potential for
dominant market power,” was congenial to republican freedom).
184. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 18–19 (discussing the institutional,
purposive, and other-regarding characteristics of fiduciary power); Getzler, supra note 83, at 585
(observing that Chancellor King’s “idea that profit from office should be barred [in fiduciary
relationships] can plausibly be connected to [his] experience battling [corruption of public
offices]”).
185. See SHEPHERD, supra note 165, at 35 (defining fiduciary power as conditioned on using
such power in the best interests of another).
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and practical interests, while constituting that power juridically in a manner
that formally rules out alien control.
2. Emancipation.—As a practical matter, of course, fiduciaries are
creatures of flesh and blood and therefore susceptible like all humankind to
the deadly sins of greed and sloth. Under republican theory, therefore, it is
not enough for fiduciary law to prescribe legal rights and duties that affirm a
universal right to freedom from domination in the abstract. To secure liberty
in a practical sense, the law must also furnish appropriate causes of action
and effective remedies to protect beneficiaries against a fiduciary’s selfdealing and waste.186 Legal sanctions that deter fiduciaries from abusing trust
may be particularly valuable as checks against domination. But perfect
deterrence is not a prerequisite for republican liberty. A legal system can
secure freedom from domination even if it does not prevent all abuses from
occurring ex ante, as long as it supplies robust accountability mechanisms to
defuse domination ex post by guaranteeing that fiduciaries are unable to
exercise arbitrary control with impunity.187
Fiduciary duties emancipate principals by ensuring that their liberty is
not compromised by fiduciary power. Whenever the law entrusts a party with
power over others’ legal or practical interests, the duty of loyalty prevents
this power from being held in a manner that engenders domination. A
fiduciary does not dominate her principal if the law requires her to exercise
entrusted power in a manner that tracks the principal’s “avowed or avowalready interests,” to borrow Pettit’s formulation.188 A fiduciary must follow
her principal’s “avowed interests,” as reflected in her express instructions,
and she must act with reasonable diligence and prudence to achieve her
principal’s “avowal-reading interests,” as reflected in her broader objectives
and purposes.189 Focusing on a principal’s “avowed or avowal-ready
interests” in this manner respects a principal’s independent agency by
requiring that exercises of fiduciary power be interpretable always as
empowering a principal to accomplish her own purposes. The duty of loyalty
thus safeguards a principal’s liberty by ensuring that she remains in a position
of formal self-mastery with respect to her fiduciary’s exercise of entrusted
power.

186. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 254–68 (discussing judicial applications of fiduciary
principles and theories for determining whether fiduciary duties should be recognized and enforced
by the law).
187. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 271 (characterizing impunity as
“domination institutionalized”).
188. Pettit, supra note 40, at 117.
189. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 104 (noting that some view the core fiduciary duty as
acting in the best interests of the beneficiary, under the tacit assumption that such interests may be
either express or implicit).
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Fiduciary duties also protect beneficiaries from domination. Absent the
duty of loyalty, a fiduciary would have the capacity to subject beneficiaries’
equitable interests to her own arbitrary control by exercising fiduciary power
in a manner that was indifferent to these interests. Beneficiaries would
therefore interact with their fiduciaries from an unequal position of
vulnerability and subservience.190 In appreciation of the fiduciary’s
dominating power, beneficiaries would be forced to maintain constant
vigilance against the threat of fiduciary misconduct. They might feel the need
to engage in self-abasement or self-censorship in order to remain within the
trustee’s good graces. Indeed, they might feel compelled to offer kickbacks
or other material inducements as security against the risk of fiduciary selfdealing.191 The duty of loyalty rescues beneficiaries from this position of
abject vulnerability by arming them with legal claims that affirm their
equitable interest in fiduciaries’ fidelity to the principal’s instructions and
purposes.
Modern fiduciary law also safeguards fiduciaries from domination,
ensuring that the requirement to pursue others’ purposes and interests does
not enslave fiduciaries to their principals and beneficiaries. Most fiduciary
relationships today are established through a voluntary undertaking, with
fiduciaries receiving handsome remuneration for services performed.192 And
fiduciaries are generally free to exit the relationship if they become
dissatisfied with the terms under which they labor.193 Thus, while fiduciary
law demands that fiduciaries exercise fiduciary power exclusively for otherregarding purposes, it does not safeguard the liberty of principals and
beneficiaries at the expense of fiduciaries’ equal freedom.
Skeptics might object that the republican tradition’s focus on
domination—the mere capacity for arbitrary interference—devotes too little
attention to a fiduciary’s wrongful exercise of power and the material harm
that may result from this exercise. The republican theory developed in this
Article recognizes, however, that domination is not the only threat to freedom
that justifies legal regulation; a fiduciary also wrongs her principal and

190. See, e.g., Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. Morgan [1985] AC 686 (HL) 609 (Lord
Scarman) (appeal taken from AC) (Eng.) (asserting that fiduciary relations arise where one party is
subject to another’s dominating influence).
191. See, e.g., Hylton v. Hylton (1754) 28 Eng. Rep. 349, 350; 2 Ves. Sen. 548, 548–49
(suggesting that if courts did not apply the no-conflict rule, trust beneficiaries might feel compelled
to offer kickbacks to secure a smooth transfer of the estate).
192. See Talley, supra note 111, at 300 (observing that “no one is required to become a
corporate fiduciary; she consents to do so voluntarily, and only then in exchange for compensation
that makes entering such a relationship worthwhile”).
193. A court-ordered constructive trust is an exception to this rule, but this relationship
generally functions as a “restitutionary proprietary remedy” rather than a free-standing fiduciary
relationship. LAC Minerals Ltd. v. Int’l Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 577–80
(Can.).
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beneficiaries if she exercises entrusted power in a manner that is indifferent
to their interests. In previous writings, Evan Fox-Decent and I have described
the arbitrary exercise of fiduciary power as “instrumentalization,” and we
have argued that the Kantian principle of noninstrumentalization
complements the principle of nondomination in specifying the normative
requirements of a republican legal order.194 Both noninstrumentalization and
nondomination are essential benchmarks for evaluating whether a legal
system meets the normative requirements of a republican legal order. By
ruling out a fiduciary’s formal capacity for arbitrary control and providing
remedies responsive to the actual exercise of arbitrary control, fiduciary law
satisfies both the principle of nondomination and the principle of
noninstrumentalization.
Contrary to the classical liberal theory, however, fiduciary law’s formal
structure is not devoted to protecting beneficiaries from material harm. A
fiduciary who treats entrusted power as a means to her own ends wrongs her
beneficiaries even if her actions do not harm their interests—for example,
when an investment manager purchases highly profitable investments for a
client, but, in the process, also receives undisclosed kickbacks without the
client’s consent. Conversely, a fiduciary may harm her beneficiaries’
interests without committing any wrong—for example, when an investment
manager selects prudent investments, but the investments unexpectedly lose
value. Consistent with the republican theory, the fiduciary duty of loyalty
prohibits fiduciaries from subjecting entrusted power to their own alien
control; it does not fully insure beneficiaries’ interests against harm.
Republicanism thus clarifies the fiduciary relationship’s unique threat
to liberty. What distinguishes fiduciary relationships from ordinary arm’slength relationships is that a fiduciary receives power in “trust” (fides) for
another.195 The power entrusted to a fiduciary is, by definition, not her own;
rather, she receives entrusted power in an official capacity on the condition
that she exercise the powers associated with her office in a manner that is
consistent with her purposive mandate. The fiduciary mandate circumscribes
the outer limits of a fiduciary’s authority to hold and exercise entrusted
power. Accordingly, an agent who treats fiduciary power as a means to
advance her own ends dominates her principal by arbitrarily displacing the
principal’s decisions concerning how her own legal rights and powers will be
exercised. Similarly, a trustee who treats fiduciary power as a means to
advance her own ends wrongs her beneficiaries by asserting alien control
over their legal and practical interests. This corruption of the fiduciary office

194. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 78.
195. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2006) (“The Latin root of fiduciary—’fides’—means ‘faith,’ as in trust, reliability, or
faithfulness . . . .”).
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constitutes a distinctive form of domination—the betrayal of trust—that
justifies fiduciary law’s distinctive duty of loyalty with its associated
remedies.
The idea that “betrayal of trust” lies at the heart of fiduciary loyalty
resonates with the familiar refrain in American jurisprudence that fiduciary
relationships are distinguished by “trust and confidence.”196 All fiduciary
relationships involve trust and confidence in the strictly formal, legal sense
that fiduciaries exercise powers that are entrusted to exercise. Parties to
fiduciary relationships may also subjectively trust one another to meet their
respective obligations,197 but “the fact that one person subjectively trusted
another—is neither necessary for nor conclusive of the existence of a
fiduciary relationship.”198 In determining whether or not a relationship is
fiduciary, courts do not ask whether the parties actually trust one another in
a subjective sense; instead, they simply ask whether a party has received
power over another’s legal or practical interests in “trust and confidence”—
i.e., on the condition that the power be exercised exclusively for the other’s
benefit.199 Within such relationships, the fiduciary duty of loyalty ensures
that fiduciaries cannot expose their principal and beneficiaries to domination
by subjecting entrusted power to their own alien control.
Some scholars argue that the primary purpose of fiduciary law is to
inculcate social norms, encouraging fiduciaries to practice loyalty and care
out of a sense of moral obligation.200 The implicit corollary of this view is
196. E.g., Advocare Int’l LP v. Horizon Labs., Inc., 524 F.3d 679, 695–96 (5th Cir. 2008)
(noting that the court below had instructed the jury that “a fiduciary duty may arise informally from
a ‘relationship of trust and confidence’”); Amendola v. Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 1990)
(observing that even in the absence of a formal fiduciary relationship, a constructive trust may be
recognized by the court where a relationship of “trust and confidence” exists); see also Gerdes v.
Estate of Cush, 953 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1992) (characterizing “the position of trust” as the
fiduciary relationship’s distinguishing feature).
197. See Harding, supra note 165, at 84–85 (emphasizing this feature of fiduciary
relationships).
198. Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41, ¶ 69 (Austl.). Parties to
relational contracts often exercise trust in one another, yet a fiduciary relationship is not triggered
unless one of the parties has conferred power on the other on the condition that the power be held
and exercised exclusively for other-regarding purposes. See id. (using the example of the
contractor–subcontractor relationship to illustrate this point).
199. See Evans v. Taco Bell Corp., 2005 WL 2333841, at *12 (D.N.H. Sept. 23, 2005)
(explaining that “‘confidence’ in this context does not equate with simple reliance on another to
perform a bargained-for service, but denotes a ‘special confidence reposed in one who . . . is bound
to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence’” (quoting
Lash v. Cheshire Cty. Sav. Bank, 474 A.2d 980, 982 (1984))).
200. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1266 (1999) (noting that “[a]lthough the regulatory function of these legal rules is important,
the social norm of loyalty that the legal rules support and define is critical to the efficient operation
of the duty of loyalty”); Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners,
Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 857 (identifying fiduciary duties as “broad
standards,” which are “all-encompassing” as moral obligations “pervasively to act loyally, in good
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that fiduciary law could be discarded in a world where all fiduciaries could
be trusted to refrain from opportunism.201 The republican theory challenges
this view. Fiduciary virtue might be desirable, but it is not strictly necessary
to preserve freedom from domination. As long as legal norms and
institutions ensure that a fiduciary cannot engage in opportunism with
impunity, a fiduciary’s motivations for loyal or disloyal behavior are legally
and practically irrelevant.202 Nor is a fiduciary’s commitment to social norms
sufficient to secure liberty. The classic examples of the virtuous king and
benevolent slave master illustrate that domination can be present even if a
power holder’s intentions and actions are above reproach.203 Even if all
fiduciaries were angels, fiduciary law would still be necessary as a formal
matter to affirm that loyalty and care are legal obligations and not merely
social conventions that depend for their fulfillment on a fiduciary’s unilateral
discretion, personal morality, or good will.
Republicanism thus offers a robust interpretive account of the normative
basis for fiduciary loyalty. Under the republican theory, the duty of loyalty
is not merely a subset of contractual obligations or property rules, as some
scholars have suggested.204 It is not a prophylactic requirement intended to
promote the performance of non-fiduciary obligations.205 Nor is its primary
purpose to lower transaction costs in private bargaining,206 provide a
framework for optimal deterrence,207 or promote voluntary adherence to
social norms.208 Instead, the requirements of fiduciary loyalty serve primarily
faith, and with due care”); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (comparing Delaware courts’ opinions on
fiduciary duties to sermons and parables which serve as a form of instruction to practitioners).
201. See Eisenberg, supra note 200, at 1274 (“[I]f all corporate actors fully internalized the
social norm of loyalty and gave full effect to that norm, the costs of both legal sanctions and
monitoring and bonding systems would be unnecessary . . . .”).
202. See SELLERS, supra note 39, at 67 (noting John Adams’s observation that in a republican
system liberty may flourish “even among highwaymen”).
203. See Pettit, supra note 43, at 44 (“From the earliest Roman days, the republican tradition
insisted that being under the power of a master—in potestate domini—meant being un-free, even if
that master was quite benevolent and allowed you a great deal of leeway.”).
204. See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman, On Trust and Transubstantiation: Mitigating the Excesses of
Ownership, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 339 (discussing the duty of loyalty
as arising out of property rules); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 426 (arguing that fiduciary
loyalty is a subset of contract obligations); Langbein, supra note 7, at 657–59 (contending that
fiduciary loyalty is fundamentally contractarian); cf. Smith, supra note 63, at 1402 (asserting that
fiduciary loyalty is based on the respect of a “critical resource belonging to the beneficiary”).
205. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 4 (articulating a theory that fiduciary duties are “designed
to assist with ensuring proper performance of non-fiduciary duties”).
206. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 26, at 28–30 (describing how fiduciary obligations
reduce the need for contracting parties to negotiate over remote contingencies).
207. See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1052 (analyzing deterrence problems in the
context of fiduciary obligations).
208. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 200, at 1016 (describing fiduciary duties as standards meant to
influence the social behavior of directors, officers, and lawyers).
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to emancipate private parties by defining and regulating fiduciary power in a
manner that formally precludes domination from corrupting the fiduciary
relationship.
B.

Identifying Fiduciary Relationships

Private law theorists have struggled in the past to devise principled
criteria for distinguishing fiduciary relationships from non-fiduciary
relationships.209 Courts have held that certain categories of private
relationships always trigger fiduciary duties, including agent–principal,
trustee–beneficiary, guardian–ward, director/officer–corporation, attorney–
client, and doctor–patient.210 Other categories of private relationships, such
as employer–employee, are sometimes held to trigger fiduciary duties, but
sometimes not, depending upon case-specific features of the relationships
between specific parties.211 Legislatures and courts have not always been
clear and consistent, however, in their efforts to explain which relationships
qualify as “fiduciary.” As a result, fiduciary law’s borders remain
theoretically and doctrinally nebulous.
In recent years, legal scholars have proposed a variety of tests for
distinguishing fiduciary relationships from non-fiduciary relationships.
Some have argued that fiduciary duties are a product of contractual
agreement or voluntary undertaking.212 As discussed previously, however,
the voluntarist theory struggles to account for fiduciary relationships that
arise without parties’ express or implied consent. Rather than consider the
parties’ actual intentions, courts tend to ascribe fiduciary duties to specific
relationships based on whether one of the parties has reposed special “trust
and confidence” in the other.213 Where this feature is present, courts
commonly hold that the duty of loyalty applies even if the party who holds
entrusted power persistently rejects the implication that she bears fiduciary

209. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 923–24 (concluding that fiduciary relationships lack a common theoretical
basis). See generally Miller, supra note 2 (reviewing theories based on contract, property, and
vulnerability, and offering a legal-formalist alternative).
210. See DeMott, supra note 164, at 1258 (observing that “fiduciary-duty analysis usually
proceeds categorically”).
211. See id. (explaining that assessments of ad hoc fiduciary status in the employment context
depend “on fact-specific inquiries”); Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship,
104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (analyzing employer fiduciary duties based on the specific facts
of an employment relationship).
212. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 427 (concluding that a fiduciary relationship
“is a contractual one”); James Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 L.Q. REV. 302,
310–13 (2010) (arguing that voluntary undertaking is a necessary condition for fiduciary
obligation); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 7, at 447–49 (arguing that fiduciary duties are default
contractual rules).
213. See sources cited supra note 196.
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duties.214 While classical liberals might welcome a rule that would make
consent a prerequisite for the assumption of fiduciary duties, this approach
has not gained traction in the courts.
Another theory of the fiduciary relationship, advanced most forcefully
by Paul Miller, posits that fiduciary relationships share a distinctive juridical
structure.215 In Miller’s view, what makes fiduciary relationships special is
the fiduciary’s discretionary power over another party’s legally protected
rights.216 Because the legal rights that a fiduciary exercises belong to the
beneficiary rather than fiduciary, “[t]he fiduciary may not treat fiduciary
power as an unclaimed means or as a personal means.”217 Instead, the
fiduciary must treat her beneficiary always as entitled to all benefits
generated by her exercise of the entrusted power.
Miller’s juridical theory offers a powerful framework for identifying
some fiduciary relationships, but it struggles to make sense of other
relationships that are universally accepted as fiduciary. As Miller’s theory
predicts, many fiduciaries do hold discretionary power to exercise another’s
legal rights, including trustees, corporate officers, guardians, and investment
managers.218 In these relationships, it is certainly plausible to think that the
fiduciary duty of loyalty reflects the principle that beneficiaries are legally
entitled to the full fruits of any exercise of their own rights. Returning to
examples discussed previously, however, it is hard to make the case that an
arbitrator exercises the parties’ respective legal rights when she renders a
judgment or that an investment manager exercises investors’ legal rights
when she winds up a pooled fund, although in both contexts the fiduciary’s
actions may limit her beneficiaries’ subsequent choices in ways that impact
their legal interests.219 Equally problematic for Miller’s theory, courts have
also held that advisers may qualify as fiduciaries even if they lack formal

214. See SHEPHERD, supra note 165, at 66 (observing that when “fiduciary duties are attached
by operation of law,” they apply even “in the face of express rejection of those very same duties by
the fiduciary”).
215. See Miller, supra note 163, at 69–75.
216. Miller uses the term “[p]ersonal legal capacity” rather than rights, but the message is
essentially the same. Id. at 71.
217. Miller, supra note 2, at 1021.
218. See Miller, supra note 163, at 71 (observing that fiduciaries may be entrusted with power,
inter alia, to “enter into legally binding relationships for another . . . ; acquire, invest, use,
administer, or alienate property owned by or held for another; . . . to make decisions relating to the
health and personal welfare of another; [and] to institute legal proceedings to enforce or seek
vindication of legal rights for another”).
219. Miller might respond that a fiduciary in these contexts wields rights that beneficiaries
possess collectively, even though they cannot claim these rights individually. But this response
begs the question: why can groups of beneficiaries claim rights that their members do not possess
individually?
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authority to exercise their advisees’ legal rights.220 Thus, while Miller may
be correct that a person is a fiduciary if she has discretionary power to
exercise another’s legal rights, it does not necessarily follow that a person
must hold such authority to qualify as a fiduciary.
Some other scholars and judges have argued that what distinguishes
fiduciary relationships from other relationships is a fiduciary’s discretionary
power over beneficiaries’ interests, a power which renders beneficiaries
uniquely vulnerable to opportunism.221
This emphasis on power,
vulnerability, and opportunism resonates with fiduciary law’s historical roots
in equity.222 The trouble with basing fiduciary duties on such vague concepts
as power, vulnerability, and the threat of opportunism, however, is that these
factors are present in all private relationships. Hence, some further limiting
principle is needed to prevent the fiduciary concept from swallowing all of
private law. To fill this void, we need a theory of the fiduciary relationship
that is capable of justifying fiduciary duties without imposing these duties
indiscriminately as a one-size-fits-all solution to every threat of opportunism
that arises in the private sphere.
The republican theory advanced in this Article furnishes a simple
definition of the fiduciary relationship that is distinct from the contractarian,
legal-formalist, and generic-opportunism accounts. Under the republican
theory, a party is a fiduciary if she has been entrusted with power over
another party’s legal or practical interests. For the sake of clarity, it may be
helpful to break this definition down into its various component parts to allow
for closer inspection.
1. Entrustment.—A defining feature of any fiduciary relationship is
entrusted power.223 Power is “entrusted” if it does not belong to a party by
right but is nonetheless committed to her administration. Power may be
entrusted to a fiduciary by a voluntary assignment from a principal (e.g.,
attorney), by judicial appointment (e.g., receivership), or by the independent
operation of law (e.g., agent of necessity). The power may belong by right

220. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963)
(finding a fiduciary relationship between investment advisers and clients).
221. See, e.g., Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 102 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (asserting
that indicia of a fiduciary relationship include: “(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some
discretion or power. (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to
affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests. (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to
or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.”); DeMott, supra note 164, at 1259
(“Fiduciary relationships stem from or create disparities of power and information, such that the
relationship’s beneficiary is or becomes vulnerable to the [fiduciary].”).
222. See, e.g., Flannigan, supra note 26, at 393 (“The conventional function of fiduciary
regulation is to control opportunism in limited access arrangements. That function has never been
disputed.”); Smith, supra note 22, at 261 (“Equity as anti-opportunism explains not only the general
tenor, but the overall structure and particular features of fiduciary law.”).
223. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 4–5 (emphasizing entrustment as a distinguishing feature
of fiduciary relationships).
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to the principal (e.g., agency) or to a beneficiary (e.g., guardianship), or it
may be called into existence by the independent operation of law (e.g.,
arbitration). Regardless of the mechanism that triggers the entrustment of
fiduciary power, the critical feature of entrusted power is held in trust; it is
not committed to the unilateral discretion of the one who holds it.
Entrustment is a necessary feature of fiduciary relationships under the
republican theory because it facilitates the distinctive form of domination that
fiduciary loyalty is designed to neutralize: a party’s capacity to betray trust
by exercising alien control over entrusted power.
2. Power.—Fiduciary power is a form of authority. It may be de jure
or de facto. A fiduciary holds de jure power if her mandate authorizes her to
exercise another’s legal rights or powers (e.g., agency) or other powers
conferred by law (e.g., arbitration). A fiduciary holds de facto power if she
is in a position, as a practical matter, to dictate how another’s legal rights or
powers will be exercised (e.g., investment adviser). Fiduciary power may be
limited to purely nondiscretionary ministerial tasks, or it may entail
authorization to make discretionary judgments. As this Article will explain
further below, bringing nondiscretionary power within the ambit of fiduciary
loyalty is important under the republican theory because fiduciary law’s
distinctive remedies are necessary to remedy the domination entailed in a
fiduciary’s infidelity to a nondiscretionary mandate.224
3. Over Another Party’s Legal or Practical Interests.—A relationship
is fiduciary only if a person holds power relative to another person’s legal or
practical interests. Under the republican theory, it is a fiduciary’s empowered
position relative to her principal and beneficiaries that raises the threat of
alien control.225 A fiduciary’s power to set aside the choices of her principal
and disregard the legal and practical interests of her beneficiaries would
constitute domination, but for fiduciary law’s emancipating intervention.226
4. Some Applications.—The republican theory’s definition of the
fiduciary relationship elucidates the scope of fiduciary law’s domain in a
variety of respects.

224. See infra section III(C)(2).
225. Frankel asserts:
The [fiduciary] relation may expose the entrustor to risk even if he is sophisticated,
informed, and able to bargain effectively. Rather, the entrustor’s vulnerability stems
from the structure and nature of the fiduciary relation. The delegated power that
enables the fiduciary to benefit the entrustor also enables him to injure the entrustor,
because the purpose for which the fiduciary is allowed to use his delegated power is
narrower than the purposes for which he is capable of using that power.
Frankel, supra note 32, at 810.
226. See Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. Morgan [1985] AC 686 (HL) 709 (Lord Scarman)
(appeal taken from AC) (Eng.) (asserting that fiduciary relations arise where one party is subject to
another’s dominating influence).
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The republican theory confirms the conventional wisdom that some
categories of private relationships always satisfy the republican theory’s
criteria. For example, all trustees are entrusted with power over others’ legal
or practical interests. Although some trustees hold more discretionary power
than others, all bear a fiduciary duty of loyalty because the office of trustee,
by definition, involves the entrustment of power over others’ legal or
practical interests.227 Other fiduciary relationships that always satisfy these
criteria include agent–principal, officer/director–corporation, partner–
partner, guardian–ward, and attorney–client.228 Because these relationships
always meet the republican theory’s criteria, they are suitable for categorical
treatment as “status-based fiduciary relationships” under the republican
theory.229
The republican theory also explains why generations of republican
judges, politicians, and political theorists have confidently asserted that
public officials and institutions are fiduciaries.230 Like fiduciaries under
private law, public officials and institutions are entrusted with power over the
legal and practical interests of their people.231 Consequently, they bear
fiduciary obligations to exercise their entrusted power in a manner that
satisfies the requirements of fiduciary loyalty.
In addition, the republican theory supports recognizing investment
advisers as fiduciaries for their clients. Formally speaking, many investment
advisers are not legally authorized to choose investments for their clients.232
Nonetheless, courts have held that investment advisers are fiduciaries
because they hold themselves out to their clients as experts who will act in
clients’ best interests, thereby inducing their clients to entrust them with
responsibility to assist them in an official advisory capacity.233 This line of
cases is difficult to square with theories of the fiduciary relationship that
focus exclusively on a fiduciary’s exercise of de jure authority,234 but they
227. See Trustee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “trustee” as
“[s]omeone who stands in a fiduciary or confidential relation to another; esp., one who, having legal
title to property, holds it in trust for the benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that
beneficiary”).
228. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J.
INT’L L. 331, 349 (2009) (listing and detailing different types of fiduciary relationships).
229. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 241–42 (2011).
230. See sources cited supra notes 15–16.
231. See generally CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14 (covering the fiduciary duty of
public officials under international law); FOX-DECENT, supra note 17.
232. Arthur B. Laby, Advisers as Fiduciaries 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
233. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–94 (1963)
(describing the fiduciary relationship between investment advisers and clients and confirming
Congress’s designation of investment advisers as fiduciaries).
234. See, e.g., Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 386 (Can.) (Sopinka, McLachlin &
Major, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that an investment adviser is not a fiduciary because the advisee formally
“retains the power and ability to make his or her own decisions”).
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harmonize easily with the republican theory’s insight that fiduciary law is
equally concerned with domination that arises in relationships involving de
facto power. Although an investment adviser’s client retains formal control
over her investment decisions, the investment adviser receives entrusted de
facto power to guide and shape those decisions.235 Under the republican
theory, therefore, the investment adviser–advisee relationship triggers
fiduciary obligations to provide “disinterested” advice and receive informed
consent to any conflicted transactions.236
The republican theory thus explains why the current arguments for
setting aside DOL’s Fiduciary Rule are unpersuasive.237 Under the
republican theory, fiduciary duties apply to retirement-investment advisers
not for the purpose of achieving optimal deterrence of harm (as reflected in
a conventional cost–benefit analysis)238 but rather to neutralize the
domination that would arise if investment advisers had the capacity to wield
alien control over their clients’ legal and practical interests. Fiduciary law’s
traditional no-conflict and no-profit rules are strictly necessary, under
republican legal theory, to prevent domination from corrupting adviser
relationships that are premised on trust and confidence.239
Some fiduciaries exercise a combination of de jure and de facto power
over their beneficiaries’ interests. For example, when a patient authorizes a
surgeon to operate on her body, making discretionary decisions as the
operation unfolds, the surgeon exercises de jure power entrusted by the
patient herself. The surgeon therefore assumes fiduciary obligations to honor
the patient’s instructions and purposes, act with solicitude toward the
patient’s avowed or avowal-ready interests, and exercise the care and skill
expected of members of her profession. Even before surgery begins,
however, the surgeon is a fiduciary for her patient when she provides advice
on possible treatment options. Although the surgeon–adviser does not wield
formal control over her patient’s choices, the structure of the advisement
relationship is one in which the patient entrusts the surgeon with de facto
235. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining a fiduciary
relationship arises when “one person has reposed trust and confidence in another who thereby gains
influence and superiority over the other,” and that such a relationship is seen when “the agent has . . .
expert knowledge the deployment of which the principal cannot monitor” (quoting Amendola v.
Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 1990))).
236. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 188–92.
237. See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text.
238. This is not to say, however, that the Fiduciary Rule cannot survive cost–benefit analysis.
See Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, No. 16-cv-1476, 2017 WL514424, at *32–35 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 8, 2017) (concluding that DOL’s assessment of the Fiduciary Rule’s costs and benefits was
reasonable); Fiduciary Rule, supra note 148, at 20,949–52, 20,952 tbl.1 (explaining how the
Fiduciary Rule “will mitigate conflicts, support consumer choice, and deliver substantial gains for
retirement investors and economic benefits that more than justify its costs”).
239. The Fiduciary Rule exempts investment advice that is merely incidental to certain arm’slength transactions. Fiduciary Rule, supra note 148, at 20,948.
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power to shape and constrain her choices regarding her own medical care.
The surgeon is a fiduciary for her patient, therefore, regardless of the fact that
the patient retains both the formal right and the practical capacity to reject
her advice. Focusing on the threat of arbitrary control in this manner explains
not only when and how fiduciary duties apply to physicians but also to other
relationships such as attorney–client that combine de jure powers with the
provision of professional advice.
An increasingly important type of de facto power that may generate
fiduciary duties is access to confidential information.240 Private parties often
entrust confidential information to a fiduciary within the context of a broader
fiduciary relationship—for example, when a criminal defendant shares
inculpatory information with her defense attorney or a patient allows a
physician to collect sensitive data concerning her physical or emotional
health. When attorneys, physicians, counselors, and clerics accept
confidential information, they are entrusted with de facto power over the
practical interests of the party who shares the information, with the
expectation that they will use the information exclusively for the benefit of
the sharing party.241 As such, these relationships of trust and confidence
activate the fiduciary duty of loyalty, requiring the recipient to use
confidential information solely to advance her beneficiaries’ avowed or
avowal-ready interests.242 Conversely, when parties share confidential
information in contexts that do not involve the expectation that the recipient
will use the information to promote the other’s best interests (e.g., sharing
confidential business data during arm’s-length merger negotiations),
fiduciary duties do not apply.243
Fiduciary relationships formed solely by the entrustment of power over
confidential information are an example of what courts and commentators
240. See Brooks, supra note 26, at 239–40 (describing “information fiduciaries” as having both
an affirmative duty to collect and use personal information as well as a duty to observe
confidentiality standards). See generally Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, Information Fiduciaries and the
First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) (discussing the tension between “personal
privacy in the digital age” and companies’ interest in collecting, analyzing, and distributing
customers’ personal information).
241. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 209, at 882 (“[A] fiduciary’s duties go beyond mere fairness
and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the beneficiary’s best interests.”); Smith, supra note
63, at 1402, 1441 (explaining that “fiduciary relationships form when one party . . . acts on behalf
of another party . . . with respect to a critical resource belonging to the [second party],” for example,
confidential information in doctor–patient, attorney–client, and clergy–parishioner relationships).
242. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16, 49, 60 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (discussing lawyers’ fiduciary duties to keep confidences); MARK A. HALL ET AL.,
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 169–97 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the duty
of patient confidentiality).
243. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 n.22 (1983) (citing with approval Walton v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 798–99 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the possession of
confidential information within the context of an arm’s-length merger negotiation is not sufficient
to generate a fiduciary relationship and that liability would not attach in the event of its disclosure)).
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have sometimes described as “ad hoc”244 or “informal”245 fiduciary
relationships. Ad hoc fiduciary relationships arise when a particular
relationship does not fall within a status-based category of fiduciary
relationships (e.g., agency, trust) but nonetheless qualifies for the duty of
loyalty based on features specific to the relationship.246 The republican
theory suggests that courts should identify ad hoc fiduciary relationships by
asking a simple question: does a party hold entrusted power over another’s
legal or practical interests?
This test confirms current jurisprudence in a variety of respects.
Consistent with established case law, the republican theory affirms that used
car dealers are not ordinarily fiduciaries for their customers,247 cigarette
manufacturers are not ordinarily fiduciaries for their consumers,248 and
restauranteurs are not ordinarily fiduciaries for their patrons.249 Although
each of these relationships involves significant information asymmetries,
generating a risk of opportunism, the relationships are all presumptively
arm’s-length; none by definition involves an entrustment of power from one
party to another to be exercised under a purposive and other-regarding
mandate.250 Consequently, these relationships do not ordinarily render either
party vulnerable to the specific type of opportunism that triggers fiduciary
duties and remedies. The injuries that arise within these relationships can be
remedied, instead, through other regimes such as contract law, tort law,
property law, and criminal law.251
244. E.g., Galambos v. Perez, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247, 276 (Can.); DeMott, supra note 164, at
1261.
245. E.g., Advocare Int’l, LP v. Horizon Labs., Inc., 524 F.3d 679, 695 (5th Cir. 2008).
246. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[F]iduciary duties are
sometimes imposed on an ad hoc basis . . . [when] a person solicits another to trust him in matters
in which he represents himself to be expert as well as trustworthy and the other is not expert and
accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in him . . . .” (citations omitted)).
247. Cf. Guenther v. Snap-On Tools Corp., No. 90 C 4436, 1995 WL 137061, at *2–4, *9 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 28, 1995) (“While the law recognizes certain relationships . . . as being fiduciary, the
relationship between franchisor and franchisee is not among them.”), vacated in part by 1996 WL
84182 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1996).
248. See Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906, 911–13 (10th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that “ordinary transactions for the sale of cigarettes do not, as a matter of Kansas law,
create fiduciary relationships”).
249. See Evans v. Taco Bell Corp., No. Civ. 04CV103JD, 2005 WL 2333841, at *13 (D.N.H.
Sept. 23, 2005) (concluding it is “obvious” that no fiduciary relationship exists between fast-food
restaurants and their customers).
250. See, e.g., Carey Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Elgin, 392 N.E.2d 759, 763
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (“Normal trust between friends or businesses, plus a slightly dominant business
position, do not operate to turn a formal, contractual relationship into a confidential or fiduciary
relationship.”).
251. See, e.g., Engle v. Ligett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1276–77 (Fla. 2006) (denying class
certification to a large group of tobacco plaintiffs, but allowing the individual plaintiffs to proceed
with suit based on injuries resulting from the use of tobacco products); Taco Bell Corp., 2005 WL
2333841, at *5–12 (discussing the application of negligence and strict liability causes of action to
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Harder cases for the republican theory include mechanic–client and
contractor–homeowner—i.e., relationships in which a property owner
commits their property to another’s care with the expectation that the latter
will improve the property for the owner’s benefit. Courts have concluded
that auto mechanics and home contractors are not ordinarily fiduciaries for
their clients because their services “occasion no fiduciary-like trust or
equivalent reposing of faith.”252 Some commentators have questioned the
accuracy and coherency of this conclusion, arguing that clients do, in fact,
entrust auto mechanics and home contractors with de jure and de facto power
over their property interests, much as patients entrust physicians with de jure
and de facto power over their bodies.253 Although this Article does not afford
the space necessary to resolve this debate definitively, the republican theory
suggests that auto mechanics and home contractors qualify as fiduciaries only
if these relationships are conditioned, in actual practice, on the understanding
that the service providers receive authority in trust for their clients’ exclusive
benefit. If property owners do not “entrust” their property to mechanics and
contractors in this robust sense, the fiduciary duty of loyalty does not apply.
C.

The Requirements of Fiduciary Loyalty

Fiduciary relationships trigger a number of legal duties, including the
duty of care, the duty to keep and render accounts, and the duty to furnish
critical information,254 but the heart of fiduciary law is its distinctive duty of
loyalty. Despite its centrality to the theory and practice of fiduciary law, the
concept of fiduciary “loyalty” remains ambiguous and contested. As Andrew
Gold has demonstrated, courts have employed a variety of different
conceptions of fiduciary loyalty, including honoring a hypothetical bargain,
fidelity to the instructions and purposes, affirmative devotion to

injuries the plaintiff allegedly suffered from consuming food prepared by a Taco Bell employee
with Hepatitis A); United States v. Sullivan, 498 F.2d 146, 149–50 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding the
embezzlement conviction of a union employee who “possessed [a] fiduciary obligation with respect
to union funds and assets”); Karl A. Boedecker & Fred W. Morgan, Strict Liability for Sellers of
Used Products: A Conceptual Rationale and Current Status, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 178,
179–84 (1993) (reviewing cases involving strict liability claims for sales of used cars and discussing
the rationales behind the holdings).
252. Thompson v. Wis. Cty. Mut. Ins. Corp., No. 95-3107-FT, 1996 WL 330363, at *1 (Wis.
Ct. App. June 18, 1996) (per curiam); see also Guenther, 1995 WL 137061, at *9 (rejecting the idea
in dicta that “disparity of knowledge . . . would make an auto mechanic or home-repair contractor
the fiduciary of his less knowledgeable customer”). But see Council on Am.-Islamic Relations
Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 31 F. Supp. 3d 237, 257–61 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that if an
individual obtained an internship with an organization in order to take compromising video of the
organization, the individual would owe a fiduciary duty of confidentiality if he “understood himself
to be bound by and violating a duty of confidentiality and non-disclosure”).
253. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 227–28.
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76–84 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (enumerating
and discussing the specific duties owed by a trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust).
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beneficiaries’ interests, fairness and evenhandedness, and the avoidance of
conflicts.255 Taking into account the many fields where the duty of loyalty
applies and the powerful remedies available for its breach, it is no great
exaggeration to suggest that clarifying the requirements of fiduciary loyalty
ranks among the most important challenges for private law theory today.
The republican theory of fiduciary law offers new tools for addressing
this challenge. By grounding fiduciary loyalty in freedom from domination,
the republican theory helps to explain and justify the duty of loyalty’s
traditional requirements of fidelity to instructions and purposes, affirmative
devotion to beneficiaries’ interests, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and fair
and evenhanded treatment of beneficiaries.256 The republican theory thus
supports the conventional American view that the duty of loyalty has both
proscriptive and prescriptive dimensions,257 and it calls into question recent
efforts to dismantle the categorical no-conflict and no-profit rules in favor of
flexible presumptions and standards that reflect the normative commitments
of classical liberalism.
1. Fidelity to Instructions and Purposes.—Consider first the suggestion
that the duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to “be true” to her principal’s
instructions and purposes.258 According to the republican theory, a fiduciary
may exercise entrusted power only in a manner that is consistent with the
instructions and purposes enshrined in her official mandate.259 To safeguard
principals and beneficiaries from domination, the fiduciary must respect
instructions and purposes that communicate the principal’s avowed and
avowal-ready interests.260 Hence, a fiduciary’s acceptance, assertion, or
exercise of entrusted power over another’s legal or practical interests
automatically triggers a legal requirement to be true to the terms of the trust
reposed.
The republican theory rejects the popular view that the duty of loyalty
does not apply in the absence of discretion.261 Under the republican theory,
255. Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 6, at 176, 178–83.
256. As Lionel Smith has explained, the “duty of loyalty” is best understood as a legal
requirement that applies to the exercise of fiduciary power—rather than, strictly speaking, a legal
duty. Smith, supra note 124, at 142.
257. In contrast, Australian courts have held that fiduciary duties are exclusively proscriptive.
Pilmer v Duke Grp. Ltd. (2001) 207 CLR ¶ 74 (Austl.); Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 113
(Austl.).
258. Gold, supra note 255, at 180–82.
259. See, e.g., US Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Thompson, Civ. A. No. 91-2089-O, 1992 WL
350233, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 1992) (holding that an agent “violated his fiduciary duty to follow
explicit instructions” by entering unauthorized transactions).
260. See Harding, supra note 165, at 93–95 (arguing that the no-conflict rule rests on “the
requirements of respect . . . [which] forbid using other people as means to one’s own ends”).
261. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 163, at 72 (“[P]owers are ordinarily considered fiduciary only
if they are discretionary.”); DeMott, supra note 209, at 901 (“If the relationship . . . does not confer
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a person is a fiduciary if she holds entrusted power over another’s legal or
practical interests, even if that entrusted power does not involve discretionary
judgment.262 For example, an agent who is given a purely ministerial charge
to deposit money in her principal’s bank account is entrusted with de jure
power to act on her behalf. If the agent instead absconds with the money and
invests it for her own profit, she breaches her fiduciary duty of loyalty.263
The agent is liable not only for breach of contract and conversion of her
principal’s property but also for breach of the duty of loyalty. Accordingly,
a court may order rescission of the agent’s transactions, or it may order the
agent to hold the purchased investments in constructive trust and disgorge
any profits she accrued through her self-dealing pursuant to fiduciary law’s
no-profit rule.264 While contract law and property law are capable of
redressing the harm caused by the agent’s wrongful interference with her
principal’s choices, only fiduciary law is designed to redress the breach of
trust entailed in the fiduciary’s opportunistic instrumentalization of her
entrusted power.265 Thus, the duty of loyalty applies regardless of whether a
fiduciary exercises discretionary or nondiscretionary power.
2. Affirmative Devotion to Beneficiaries’ Interests.—The republican
theory also supports a requirement that fiduciaries pursue the best interests
of their beneficiaries with affirmative devotion.266 Fiduciary relationships
are distinct from ordinary contractual relationships, as Daniel Markovits has
explained, because a contract promisor is required only to “honor her
contract,” while a “fiduciary must take the initiative on her beneficiary’s
behalf” and “make new sacrifices in the face of unforeseen developments.”267

discretion on the ‘fiduciary,’ then his actions are not subject to the fiduciary constraint.”); Weinrib,
supra note 164, at 4 (asserting that “the fiduciary must have scope for the exercise of discretion”).
But see Arthur B. Laby, Book Review, 35 L. & PHIL. 123, 130–34 (2016) (reviewing
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6) (criticizing the “discretionary power” theory of
fiduciary relationships).
262. See Laby, supra note 261, at 132 (arguing that there are “many instances when courts
impose fiduciary duties on persons and firms shorn of discretionary power over another,” such as
investment advisers, lawyers, and physicians who are acting in an advisory capacity).
263. See IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1421–22 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing
that nondiscretionary “control over assets” is sufficient to trigger fiduciary duties under ERISA);
McDermott v. Party City Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 612, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (explaining that “an agent
who embezzles from his principal may be in breach of . . . the [fiduciary] duty imposed by operation
of law”).
264. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. b,
illustr. 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (observing that such remedies are available in a similar scenario
where embezzled funds are used to purchase real property).
265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 93, 100 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (defining
breach of trust and trustee liability for such a breach).
266. Evan Fox-Decent and I refer to this requirement elsewhere as the principle of “solicitude.”
See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 98 (describing the principle of solicitude as concern
for the other’s “legitimate interests”).
267. Markovits, supra note 6, at 216, 222.
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The duty of loyalty thus requires a fiduciary to tailor her actions to advance
her beneficiaries’ best interests.
A number of courts have asserted that the requirement of affirmative
devotion requires alignment between a fiduciary’s intentions and her
beneficiaries’ interests.268 In Stone v. Ritter,269 for example, the Delaware
Supreme Court famously took the position that a corporate “director cannot
act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief
that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”270 Fiduciary loyalty
therefore demands that a fiduciary exercise entrusted power in a manner that
she believes will promote the best interests of her beneficiaries.271
Purely as a matter of interpersonal ethics, the logic of Stone v. Ritter is
unassailable: a fiduciary does not act loyally if she does not believe her
actions advance her beneficiaries’ best interests. But should affirmative
devotion be enshrined as a legal obligation? The republican theory suggests
that the answer is “yes.” This conclusion may not seem particularly
surprising, given the emphasis that republicans place on the importance of
cultivating civic virtue.272 But the reasons why affirmative devotion is a legal
requirement require further elaboration.
Under the republican theory, the legal requirement of affirmative
devotion is not concerned with elevating a fiduciary’s moral rectitude for its
own sake, nor is it merely a means for reducing the likelihood of harm to
beneficiaries’ interests. Fiduciaries are required to give due regard to their
beneficiaries’ interests because this approach safeguards beneficiaries’
freedom from domination.273 A fiduciary who reserved the right to exercise
entrusted power based on reasons unrelated to her mandate and the interests
of her beneficiaries would subject the interests of her principal and

268. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (explaining that the fiduciary duty
of loyalty encompasses an obligation to act in good faith, which requires a fiduciary to act “in the
good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest”); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (“The good faith required of a . . . fiduciary includes
not simply the duties of care and loyalty . . . but all actions required by a true faithfulness and
devotion to the interests of the [beneficiary].”).
269. 911 A.2d at 362.
270. Id. at 370 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
271. Smith, supra note 124, at 148.
272. See, e.g., Besson & Martí, supra note 36, at 22–24 (extolling civic virtues such as “respect
for and loyalty to the law [and] the republic’s institutions, . . . respect for pluralism and for others’
preferences and opinions[,]” and the pursuit of “the common good . . . through political
participation” as necessary to enable and promote the political participation of an active and
motivated citizenry required by republican liberty). See generally PHILIP PETTIT, THE ROBUST
DEMANDS OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITH ATTACHMENT, VIRTUE, AND RESPECT (2015) (developing
these themes).
273. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Keeping the Promise of Public Fiduciary Theory:
A Reply to Leib and Galoob, 126 YALE L.J. F. 192, 199 (2016) (“[F]iduciary rules and remedies in
the United States . . . reflect the republican principle of non-domination.”).
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beneficiaries to alien control.274 The republican theory thus supports the
Delaware Supreme Court’s view that a fiduciary’s affirmative devotion to
her beneficiaries’ best interests is an indispensable requirement of fiduciary
loyalty.
Contrary to the views of some fiduciary scholars, however, the duty of
loyalty does not require that a fiduciary’s motives for action be wholly
uncompromised by self-regarding interests.275 Recall that the purpose of
private law, under the republican theory, is to ensure that a private party’s
legal and practical interests are not subject to another’s arbitrary control. The
loyalty requirement of affirmative devotion safeguards freedom from
domination, in part, by obligating a fiduciary to act in a manner that she
reasonably believes in good faith will maximize her beneficiaries’ interests.
When a fiduciary satisfies this requirement, her solicitude to the interests of
her beneficiaries ensures that she does not exercise alien control. From the
beneficiaries’ perspective, it does not matter whether the fiduciary’s primary
motivation for acting loyally is a desire for remuneration, fear of legal
sanctions, or other self-regarding considerations.276 As long as the fiduciary
exercises her entrusted authority in a manner that she reasonably believes will
advance her principal’s directives and her beneficiaries’ best interests, the
principal and beneficiaries cannot complain that they are subject to
domination.277 From the perspective of republican legal theory, therefore,

274. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2, at 993 (asserting that a breach of fiduciary duty may be
conceptualized as a harmful interference with the beneficiary’s personal interests).
275. But see Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY
AND TRUSTS 53, 69 (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003) (“The fiduciary obligation of loyalty requires the
fiduciary to act with a particular motive: in general, she must act (or not act) in what she perceives
to be the best interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.”); Leib & Galoob, supra note 17, at
1835–38 (asserting a conscientious- motivation requirement such that “certain ways of conforming
to fiduciary duties do not count as living up to fiduciary norms” if not based in the best interests of
the principal). Smith, in particular, argues that the no-conflict and no-profit rules are necessary to
compensate for courts’ inability to surmount the inscrutability of a fiduciary’s true motivations. See
Smith, supra, at 74 (“The prophylactic rules are triggered by situations in which it may be especially
difficult to know with what motive the fiduciary acted, because the fiduciary is subject to conflicting
motivational pressures.”).
276. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 273, at 203 (“As long as a fiduciary performs her
entrusted duties with due regard for her principal’s instructions and her beneficiaries’ best interests,
the law does not care [what] the reasons motivating her actions are. . . . As long as the . . . fiduciary
does not assert the prerogative to wield entrusted power in a manner that is indifferent to her
beneficiaries’ interests, she does not subject her beneficiary to instrumentalization or domination.”).
This is not to suggest, of course, that a fiduciary’s motivations are unimportant from the perspective
of republican ethics. See PETTIT, supra note 272, 44–48 (arguing that republican virtues impose
robust ethical demands).
277. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 212 (quoting John Trenchard’s observation that people “are
Free, where their Magistrates . . . act by Rules prescribed them by the People: And they are Slaves,
where, their magistrates choose their own Rules, and follow their Lust and Humours”).
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the better view is that fiduciary loyalty is concerned with a fiduciary’s actions
and intentions, not her motivations.278
The requirements of fidelity and affirmative devotion do not apply in
equal measure to all fiduciary relationships. As Gold and Miller have
observed, some fiduciaries are entrusted with power primarily for the purpose
of advancing the interests of designated beneficiaries (e.g., guardianships),
while others receive broad purposive mandates that do not specify discrete
beneficiaries (e.g., charitable trusts).279 When fiduciary relationships fall on
the latter end of the spectrum, the requirement of fidelity to instructions will
predominate over the requirement of affirmative devotion to beneficiaries’
best interests in some aspects of a fiduciary’s performance. The relative
salience of fidelity and affirmative devotion thus depends upon the purpose
and design of particular fiduciary relationships.
3. Fairness and Evenhandedness.—The duty of loyalty also
emancipates beneficiaries from domination by ensuring that they are treated
fairly and evenhandedly in fiduciary relationships involving rivalrous
beneficiary claims. For example, when investors commit their resources to
a hedge fund, they face not only the threat that the manager might engage in
self-dealing but also the possibility that the manager might arbitrarily confer
a disproportionate share of the profits on some favored investors to the
detriment of others. In such cases, “the discrete fiduciary duty of loyalty is
necessarily transformed into duties of fairness and reasonableness.”280 This
requirement of fair and evenhanded treatment emancipates beneficiaries with
rivalrous interests by requiring fiduciaries to exercise entrusted power in a
manner that respects the beneficiaries’ formal equality.
4. Conflict Avoidance.—The republican theory of fiduciary law also
provides a strong counterpoint to classical liberalism’s argument for diluting
the duty of loyalty’s uncompromising no-conflict and no-profit rules. As
discussed in Part II, classical liberalism posits that there is nothing inherently
immoral about a fiduciary profiting from a conflicted transaction, as long as
the transaction also benefits the principal. Accordingly, classical liberalism
characterizes the no-conflict and no-profit rules as prophylactic checks
278. See Markovits, supra note 6, at 220 (“Legal obligations—both contractual and fiduciary—
turn on intentions not motivations.”).
279. Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513,
517 (2015).
280. FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE, supra note 17, at 34–35; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (providing that “the trustee
must act impartially and with due regard for the diverse beneficial interests created by the terms of
the trust”); P.D. Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES AND
TRENDS 131, 138 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995) (“It is uncontroversial fiduciary law that where a
fiduciary serves classes of beneficiaries possessing different rights, . . . the fiduciary is . . . required
to act fairly as between different classes of beneficiary in taking decisions which affect the rights
and interests of the classes inter se.”).

CRIDDLE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1048

4/4/2017 1:40 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 95:993

against opportunism: by prohibiting all self-interested transactions and profit
taking without a principal’s consent—regardless of a fiduciary’s intent or
whether the beneficiary has been harmed—fiduciary law eliminates a
fiduciary’s incentives to abuse her position and lowers the principal’s
monitoring and bonding costs. Experts have argued that these rules also
correct for information asymmetries by preventing a fiduciary from
exploiting the fact that she “controls all evidence of the relationship and can
easily conceal wrongdoing from the vulnerable party or the court.”281 Yet,
as Langbein has argued, in theory these concerns can all be addressed in a
less onerous way: by placing the burden squarely on fiduciaries to
demonstrate that unauthorized conflicted transactions maximized
beneficiaries’ profits (or minimized losses) relative to other available
opportunities.282
The republican theory of fiduciary law flatly rejects this reasoning.
According to the republican theory, an agent, trustee, or corporate director
has no legal authority to use fiduciary power in the service of her own ends
and, accordingly, may not retain any profits that result from transactions
associated with the fiduciary office.283 The other-regarding character of the
fiduciary office requires a fiduciary to reserve any surplus generated by
conflicted transactions for the benefit of her principal.284 A fiduciary’s
withholding of this surplus to any degree constitutes a betrayal of trust that is
inimical to the other-regarding character of the fiduciary relationship. This
abuse of trust is wrongful even if it does not harm the beneficiaries’ material
interests.285 Accordingly, a party who holds fiduciary power may not use that
power to advance her own self-interest unilaterally (i.e., without informed
consent), even if such action indisputably promotes her beneficiaries’
interests.
Significantly, if a fiduciary truly believes that a conflicted transaction
will best promote her beneficiaries’ interests, the no-conflict and no-profit

281. Getzler, supra note 83, at 586.
282. Langbein, supra note 77, at 981.
283. See ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 11 (3d ed. 1955) (reviewing the history of the no-conflict
and no-profit rules of fiduciary duty). The no-conflict and no-profit rules do not, however, preclude
a fiduciary from receiving reasonable fees for services rendered pursuant to contract or with judicial
approval.
284. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV.
559, 563 (2006) (“A fiduciary who wrongfully makes a personal gain through the use of his position,
or of property or information that he holds through his position, must disgorge that gain to his
beneficiary even if the beneficiary has suffered no loss from the wrong.”).
285. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between wrongs and harms, see ARTHUR
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 30–56 (2009).
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rules do not actually preclude the transaction from taking place;286 the
fiduciary need only take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the potential
conflict from introducing domination. The fiduciary may disclose the
potential conflict and obtain beneficiaries’ advance consent to the
transaction’s terms, thereby authorizing her to withhold profits acquired in a
personal capacity through the transaction.287 Or she may voluntarily
relinquish all profits accrued in her personal capacity in order to satisfy her
fiduciary obligation to reserve all surplus generated by the transaction for her
beneficiaries.288 Either choice would eliminate the conflict of interest, defuse
the fiduciary’s capacity for alien control, and thereby satisfy the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. There is no inherent conflict, therefore, between a fiduciary
acting in her beneficiaries’ “sole interest” while also advancing their “best
interests.”
The republican theory thus opposes classical liberalism’s call to scale
back or eliminate fiduciary law’s traditional no-conflict and no-profit rules.
In particular, it shows how Delaware’s “entire fairness” test, which permits
corporate directors to engage in self-interested transactions without informed
consent, subjects corporations (and thereby, indirectly, their shareholders) to
domination.289 It also explains why recent efforts to scale back the duty of
loyalty in agency and trust law should be resisted in the interest of
safeguarding liberty.
5. The Mandatory Core.—Although this Article cannot address every
aspect of the duty of loyalty, one final contribution of the republican theory
merits brief consideration: the theory’s novel justification for fiduciary law’s
“mandatory core.”290 Some scholars of law and economics have argued that
all fiduciary duties are contractual default rules and therefore should be freely
waivable with beneficiaries’ informed consent.291 Others have asserted,

286. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (explaining the
specific exemptions to the no-conflict rule, including transactions allowed by consent of all
beneficiaries).
287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (providing that
an agent may obtain a material benefit arising out of her position when she obtains her principal’s
consent).
288. Id. § 8.02 cmt. e (describing available remedies when an agent obtains a material benefit
arising out of her position without having secured her principal’s consent).
289. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2016) (explaining the “entire fairness” test,
where a corporate director may engage in conflicted transactions without informed consent of
beneficiaries), with PETTIT, supra note 11, at 31–41 (discussing the republican tradition and its
association with nondomination).
290. Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 1046.
291. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 26, at 71–72 (arguing for a new concept of the
corporation that recognizes the power of private ordering, market forces, and “private controls on
managerial conduct,” while deemphasizing the role of fiduciary duties); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 7, at 427, 431–32 (theorizing that “a ‘fiduciary’ relation is a contractual one” and that
courts “setting out to protect principals from their agents must use the hypothetical contract
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however, that economic theory can support treating some loyalty
requirements as mandatory rules.292 In arguably the most sophisticated
economic defense of mandatory rules, Robert Sitkoff asserts that the duty of
loyalty’s “mandatory core” serves two functions: (1) it “insulates fiduciary
obligations that the law assumes would not be bargained away by a fully
informed, sophisticated principal”;293 and (2) it provides “clean lines of
demarcation across types of legal relationships, among other things to
minimize third-party information costs.”294 Viewed from this perspective,
classical liberalism can support mandatory rules as autonomy-reinforcing
safeguards that address the risks of harm that arise in fiduciary relationships.
The republican theory offers a different justification for fiduciary law’s
mandatory core. Although republicanism generally supports allowing
principals to structure fiduciary relationships in ways that deviate from
fiduciary law’s baseline rules, this concession to individual choice has a
nonnegotiable limit: Fiduciary relationships may not be structured in a
manner that subjects beneficiaries’ legal or practical interests to a fiduciary’s
unfettered alien control.
This bedrock nondomination principle explains and justifies the current
features of fiduciary law’s mandatory core. It supports the rule that a
principal may not authorize a fiduciary to act in bad faith or otherwise violate
the terms or purposes of the fiduciary relationship.295 Nor may beneficiaries
waive the fiduciary duty to provide information relevant to informed
consent.296 The nondomination principle also reinforces courts’ common
practice of construing waivers of fiduciary duties narrowly to ensure that
consent is fully informed.297 These features of contemporary fiduciary law

approach” to determine whether fiduciary duties apply); Langbein, supra note 7, at 658 (observing
that fiduciary duties are prevailingly, if not obviously, contractarian; “[c]ontract is there, but not
always at first glance”); Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 1046 (“[V]arious fiduciary duties are for the most
part default rules that apply unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”).
292. See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 1046 (theorizing “mandatory rules” of the “fiduciary
obligation that cannot be overridden by agreement”).
293. Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 205.
294. Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 112, at 1624 (“[T]hird-party effects justify a certain
minimum level of judicial paternalism . . . .”).
295. See Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 663–64 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that stockholder
ratification is not a “blank check” for conflicted transactions that cannot plausibly be interpreted as
advancing the corporation’s best interests); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96(1)(a) (AM.
LAW INST. 2007) (providing that an exculpation clause is unenforceable if it purports to relieve a
trustee “of liability for a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with indifference to the fiduciary
duties of the trustee, the terms or purposes of the trust, or the interests of the beneficiaries”).
296. See, e.g., Sample, 914 A.2d at 664–67 (holding that director ratification cannot preclude a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty if the directors failed to disclose material facts).
297. See Deborah A. DeMott, Defining Agency and its Scope (II), in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT
LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 396, 398 (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg eds.,
2016) (“[A] principal’s consent to conduct that would otherwise breach a fiduciary duty requires
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are necessary to prevent principals and beneficiaries from placing their legal
and practical interests under fiduciaries’ “uncontrolled discretion.”298 Just as
courts will not enforce contracts in which one person consents to become
another’s slave or involuntary servant,299 principals and beneficiaries may not
contract to subject their legal or practical interests to a fiduciary’s alien
control through general waivers of fiduciary duties.
D.

Understanding Fiduciary Remedies

Another important contribution of the republican theory is the link it
forges between the formal legal character of fiduciary power and the
remedies that courts have traditionally offered to address breaches of the duty
of loyalty. Fiduciary theorists who embrace classical liberalism tend to
characterize traditional fiduciary remedies, such as constructive trust and
disgorgement, as supracompensatory measures that deter opportunism.300 In
contrast, the republican theory suggests that these remedies are appropriate
to support the principle that a fiduciary is legally incapable of holding or
exercising fiduciary power except in trust for her principal and
beneficiaries.301
The republican theory’s account of fiduciary remedies closely tracks
Paul Miller’s juridical theory of fiduciary remedies.302 In a series of pathbreaking publications, Miller has argued that the distinctive feature of
fiduciary relationships is that a fiduciary “stands in substitution for the
beneficiary or a benefactor in exercising a legal capacity that is ordinarily
derived from the beneficiary or benefactor’s legal personality.”303 Because
in Miller’s view the legal rights exercised by a fiduciary are vested in the
specificity.”); Miller, supra note 2, at 1006 (observing that “broad waivers or contractual clauses
purporting to completely exclude fiduciary liability are usually read down or held void”).
298. In re Will of Allister, 545 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
299. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime . . . , shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”).
300. See, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1115–16 (1988) (discussing how stricter fiduciary
rules help “deter conduct by the fiduciary that is inconsistent with the . . . welfare of the
beneficiaries”); Smith, supra note 64, at 1404 (“[F]iduciary law can be justified on the grounds that
it deters opportunistic behavior.”); cf. James J. Edelman, Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and
Wrongs, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1869, 1876 (2001) (asserting that courts apply “disgorgement damages”
to fiduciary relationships because “there is a profound need for deterrence not fulfilled by
compensatory damages”).
301. See, e.g., SHEPHERD, supra note 165, at 93 (“The essence of this theory of fiduciary
relationships is that powers are a species of property, which can be beneficially owned by one person
while being exercised by another person, who may be referred to as the legal owner of the power.”).
302. See Miller, supra note 163, at 69 (defining “[a] fiduciary relationship [as] one in which
one party (the fiduciary) exercises discretionary power over the significant practical interests of
another (the beneficiary)”).
303. Id. at 70–71.
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principal or beneficiary rather than the fiduciary, “[t]he fiduciary may not
treat fiduciary power as an unclaimed means or as a personal means.”304
Instead, the fiduciary must treat her beneficiary always as the exclusive
beneficiary of her exercise of entrusted power. Miller argues that
disgorgement is an appropriate remedy for fiduciary disloyalty, because
within a fiduciary relationship “[n]o one is entitled to gain from the execution
of a fiduciary mandate save the beneficiary; to the extent that there are such
gains, they belong to the beneficiary.”305 In Miller’s view, therefore, the noprofit rule reflects the simple principle that a beneficiary is entitled to enjoy
the full benefits of the exercise of her own legal powers.306
The republican theory refines Miller’s juridical account of fiduciary
remedies by elucidating its implicit normative underpinnings. Consistent
with Miller’s account, fiduciary remedies affirm that fiduciaries may not
dominate their beneficiaries by treating entrusted fiduciary power as an
instrument for advancing their own interests without beneficiaries’
consent.307 Giving beneficiaries the option to seek rescission of unauthorized
conflicted transactions promotes freedom from domination by affirming that
fiduciaries lack the legal capacity to use fiduciary power for their own benefit
unilaterally. If beneficiaries conclude that an unauthorized conflicted
transaction was, in fact, the best option for maximizing their own profits (or
minimizing losses), they may elect to leave the transaction intact and compel
the fiduciary to hold, and ultimately disgorge, any profits generated by the
transaction.308 Constructive trust and disgorgement thus prevent the
fiduciary from dictating unilaterally the terms under which profits generated
by a conflicted transaction will be divided between herself and her
beneficiaries. Collectively, these traditional fiduciary remedies prevent a
fiduciary from wielding alien control over her beneficiaries’ legal and
practical interests.
The republican theory clarifies why disgorgement is justified in settings
where fiduciary disloyalty produces gains that principals and beneficiaries
would not be entitled to generate for themselves. Consider the case of a
fiduciary who accepts bribes from a third party. Courts routinely hold that
public officials who accept bribes violate their duty of loyalty and must
relinquish bribes to their government employers.309 Disgorgement of bribes

304. Miller, supra note 2, at 1021.
305. Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 570, 616 (2013).
306. Id. at 616–17.
307. See, e.g., id. at 585 (noting that a fiduciary is subject to fiduciary liability when the
fiduciary allows his own interests or those of a third party to “actually or potentially . . . conflict
with the interests of the beneficiary”).
308. See MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 79, at 186.
309. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1909) (requiring an agent to account
to his principal for any benefit received in “violation of his duty”); United States v. Drumm, 329
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exposes a tension within Miller’s juridical account of fiduciary law because
a public official cannot be understood in any meaningful sense to have been
entrusted with authority to collect bribes.310 Moreover, as Deborah DeMott
has observed, even if the concept of entrusted power
is defined more broadly, perhaps as the power to deal with third parties
on the principal’s behalf, the facts that the power was used for an
illegal end, and thus that the principal could not itself directly use the
power to the same end, make it hard to explain why the proceeds of
the transaction belong to the principal.311
Federal courts wrestled with this question during the late 1980s, when
they were asked to decide whether bribery constituted a form of fraud under
the federal mail fraud statute.312 In McNally v. United States,313 the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction of a Kentucky state official who had
participated in a self-dealing patronage scheme because the jury in the case
had not been asked to decide whether the official had defrauded the state of
any money or property.314 The Court based its decision, in part, on the idea
that the state lacked an ownership interest in kickbacks from government
contractors.315 Justice Stevens conceded this point in his dissent, but he
argued that the defendant, as a state official, was duty bound to deliver
anything he received “as a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty to the
principal.”316 He therefore asserted that “[t]his duty may fulfill the Court’s
‘money or property’ requirement in most kickback schemes.”317 Following
McNally, however, lower federal courts overwhelmingly rejected Justice

F.2d 109, 113 (1st Cir. 1964) (holding an agent accountable for “all profits in excess of his lawful
compensation”); United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75–77 (D.D.C.
2008) (noting that an agent with two “paymasters” necessarily creates a conflict of interest and that
failing to disclose and seek approval for the additional payment constituted a breach of fiduciary
duty warranting disgorgement); Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 11–15 (N.J. 1955) (allowing the
recovery of money taken wrongfully from the principal by the agent through restitution, thus
preventing the “unfaithful public official” from wrongfully profiting).
310. Compare Miller, supra note 163, at 70–71 (suggesting that fiduciary power derives from
a beneficiary’s legal capacities), with Miller, supra note 305, at 600 (asserting that disgorgement of
bribes can be justified based on a beneficiary’s “quasi-proprietary” right to fiduciary loyalty itself).
311. DeMott, supra note 209, at 912–13.
312. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); see also id. § 1346 (defining “scheme or artifice to defraud” as
including a “scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services”).
313. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
314. Id. at 360–61.
315. Id. at 351, 360.
316. Id. at 365–66, 377 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)).
317. Id. Justice O’Connor joined all of Justice Stevens’s dissent except the concluding section
that contained this proposal. Id. at 362.
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Stevens’s duty-based theory.318 Following Judge Posner’s lead,319 several
circuits reasoned that disgorgement of bribes might be justified under
fiduciary law as a deterrence measure, but they flatly rejected the idea that
this remedy could be based on a governmental property interest in bribes.320
The republican theory developed in this Article offers a different
justification for fiduciary law’s disgorgement remedy and, in so doing,
clarifies why the government is entitled to demand disgorgement of bribes as
a civil remedy for breach of fiduciary duty. Consistent with Miller’s juridical
theory, the republican theory takes disgorgement on its own terms as a
remedy for wrongful withholding of property rather than as a prophylactic or
compensatory measure. The republican theory avoids the implausible
suggestion that the government has a property right in bribes. Instead, the
disgorgement remedy tracks the other-regarding character of the fiduciary
office itself: when acting within the scope of her office, a fiduciary is legally
incapable of accepting assets except in trust for her beneficiaries.321 As the
Supreme Court has explained in another landmark corruption case, United
States v. Carter,322 disgorgement “results not from the subject-matter but
from the fiduciary character of the one against whom it is applied.”323 Hence,
disgorgement is not dependent upon a finding that the government would be
entitled to receive bribery payments in the absence of a public official’s
disloyalty, nor is it contingent upon a finding or presumption that the

318. See, e.g., United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1422–24 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the
“duty of loyalty” theory that would make a government employee guilty of mail fraud against his
employer for accepting bribes); United States v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485, 1491–92 (10th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (holding that the constructive trust theory is not sufficient to sustain a mail fraud
conviction for lost intangible rights); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 525–27 (1st Cir. 1988)
(noting that the Supreme Court effectively rejected Justice Stevens’s argument in McNally and that
the courts may not “recharacterize every breach of fiduciary duty as a financial harm”); United
States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1346–48 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that the placement of bribe money
into a constructive trust does not make it government property for the purpose of a mail fraud
conviction). But see United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1186–88 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
that bribes are “a benefit which properly belongs to the [state], which is the principal, rather than
the official, officer, or employee, who is merely a fiduciary-agent”), rev’d and vacated en banc, 877
F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1989).
319. See Holzer, 840 F.2d at 1348 (Posner, J.) (“A constructive trust is imposed on the bribes
not because [a public servant] . . . failed to account for money received on the state’s account but in
order to deter bribery by depriving the bribed official of the benefit of the bribes.”).
320. Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1422–24; Shelton, 848 F.2d at 1491–92.
321. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“If an agent
receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty to the principal, he is subject to a
liability to deliver it, its value, or its proceeds, to the principal.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
RESTITUTION § 197 (AM. LAW INST. 1937) (“Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the
beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or other profit, he holds what he receives
upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary.”).
322. 217 U.S. 286 (1910).
323. Id. at 306.
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government suffered financial or other material harm from the bribery.324
Under the republican theory, the fact that a public official’s entrusted position
of authority enables him to obtain bribes is enough to trigger the requirement
that he hold the assets in trust and relinquish them to his employer for the
public’s benefit. The violation of this requirement wrongs a fiduciary’s
beneficiaries by betraying the other-regarding terms of the fiduciary’s
entrusted power, irrespective of whether beneficiaries suffer material
harm.325 Disgorgement in this context thus affirms the fiduciary character of
public offices by ensuring that “[t]he citizen is not at the mercy of his servants
holding positions of public trust.”326
E.

The Divergence of Fiduciary Conduct and Decision Rules

The republican theory also helps to explain the deferential standards of
review that courts have applied across many fields of fiduciary law.
Although courts often assert that fiduciaries must pursue their principals’
objectives with “utmost good faith,” observing “the highest standards of
honor and honesty,”327 they rarely find a breach of fiduciary duty absent
evidence of egregious abuse. Perhaps the best known example of this
phenomenon is corporate law’s “business judgment rule,” which requires
courts to accept business decisions that disinterested directors have made
deliberatively and in good faith—even if those decisions ultimately harmed
the interests of the corporation or its stockholders.328 Corporate law is hardly
unique, however, in its deferential approach to fiduciary decision making.
Courts also apply a healthy measure of deference to fiduciaries’ discretionary

324. See Hawaiian Int’l Fins., Inc. v. Pablo, 488 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Haw. 1971) (stating that the
rule against a fiduciary retaining a bonus, commission, or other profit from third parties “is
applicable although the profit received by the fiduciary is not at the expense of the beneficiary”
(quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 197 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1937)).
325. See Bos. Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v. Ansell [1888] 39 Ch. D. 339 at 357 (Eng. &
Wales) (Cotton, L.J.) (concluding that “where an agent . . . without the knowledge or assent of [the]
principal, receives money from the person with whom he is dealing, he is doing a wrongful act” and
must relinquish the money to the principal).
326. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 222 (N.J. 1952).
327. Grossberg v. Haffenberg, 11 N.E.2d 359, 360 (Ill. 1937); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (defining a director’s duty of loyalty as an “unyielding fiduciary
duty to [pursue the purposes and interests of] the corporation and its shareholders”), overruled on
other grounds, Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510
(Del. 1939) (describing the duty of loyalty as a “rule that demands of a corporate officer or director,
peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, . . . affirmatively to
protect the interests of the corporation”).
328. See D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 83, 83 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016)
(describing the traditional business judgment rule as a mechanism to shield corporate directors from
liability for “honest mistakes” when the directors made the decision in a careful, loyal, and goodfaith manner).
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judgments in other contexts, including trust law329 and bankruptcy law.330
These deferential standards of review have produced a stark divergence
between the legal “conduct rules” that formally regulate fiduciary
performance (e.g., diligence, affirmative devotion) and the deferential
“decision rules” that govern judicial review in some contexts (e.g.,
negligence, intentional malfeasance).331
The republican theory lends support for the idea that a fiduciary’s “duty
of the finest loyalty” is a genuine legal obligation rooted in the fiduciary
relationship itself, and not merely an aspirational moral or social norm.332
The strict conduct rules that flow from this general obligation (e.g., fidelity
to instructions, affirmative devotion to beneficiaries, and fairness and
evenhandedness) safeguard liberty by ensuring that a fiduciary lacks the
formal legal capacity to use entrusted power as a form of alien control over
the legal or practical interests of her beneficiaries. These conduct rules
pervasively regulate fiduciary power, constituting fiduciary relationships
juridically in a manner that formally rules out domination.
At the same time, the republican theory is sensitive to the fact that
formal conduct rules are not sufficient to secure freedom from domination in
practice. Recall that for republicans, liberty is constituted not only by libertyaffirming conduct rules but also by effective legal and political institutions.
The republican theory’s success depends in no small part, therefore, on courts
implementing fiduciary law in a manner that promotes liberty.
The challenge for republicans is that judges, like other fiduciaries, have
the practical capacity to exercise arbitrary power.333 To guard against the
threat of judicial domination, courts must calibrate fiduciary law’s decision
rules to prevent judicial oversight from increasing overall net domination in
329. E.g., Crabb v. Young, 92 N.Y. 56, 66 (N.Y. 1883) (“[W]hile trustees are . . . held to great
strictness in their dealings with the interests of their beneficiaries, the court will regard them
leniently when it appears they have acted in good faith, and if no improper motive can be attributed
to them, the court have even excused an apparent breach of trust, unless the negligence is very
gross.”).
330. See, e.g., In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 45, 50 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[The] judge . . .
is not to substitute her judgment for that of the [bankruptcy] trustee, and the trustee’s judgment is
to be accorded some deference.” (quoting In re Moorhead Corp., 208 B.R. 87, 90 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
1997))).
331. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437–38 (1993) (commenting on the
variance between “standards of conduct” that set forth how to perform an activity and “standards of
review” that govern the associated litigation in corporate law); Julian Velasco, The Role of
Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 521–22 (2012) (“Courts
often opine on the relatively demanding standard of conduct, but their judgments must be based on
the more forgiving standard of review.”).
332. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
333. See Getzler, supra note 83, at 598 (noting Peter Birks’s concern that moralistic
formulations of fiduciary loyalty may “descend into a formless anarchy of opinion,” serving as “a
prelude to power-mongering and tyranny”).
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fiduciary relationships.334 Yasmin Dawood refers to this approach to judicial
oversight as the “antidomination model” of judicial review.335
Under the republican theory’s antidomination model and consistent with
prevailing practice, judicial deference to fiduciary judgments turns on two
considerations. First, courts should respect the fact that in a variety of
contexts the law entrusts fiduciaries with discretionary authority to decide
what particular measures will best advance their principals’ purposes and
their beneficiaries’ interests.336 Second, courts should take into account that
they are poorly equipped to evaluate whether some fiduciary decisions satisfy
the duty of loyalty. How much judicial deference is appropriate in a
particular context depends upon the interplay between these two
considerations.
Whenever a fiduciary exercises entrusted discretionary power, the
republican theory supports highly deferential decision rules. For example,
courts wisely apply a strong form of deference when they review guardians’
discretionary judgments regarding the interests of their wards.337 The law
entrusts guardians with sweeping responsibility to ascertain and develop
strategies to advance the best interests of their beneficiaries.338 By virtue of
their regular contact with their wards, guardians are typically in a better
position than judges to discern what measures will maximize their wards’
idiosyncratic preferences.339 Corporate law’s business judgment rule reflects
similar concerns. Courts defer to corporate directors’ discretionary business
decisions because directors are primarily responsible to decide what
measures will best advance their corporation’s purposes, and courts usually
lack the information and expertise necessary to second-guess those
decisions.340 Were courts to conduct de novo review of such decisions, they
334. See Dawood, supra note 50, at 1418 (arguing that the purpose of judicial intervention is
“to prevent the most dominating . . . action with judicial intervention that is the least dominating”).
335. Id.
336. See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006) (providing
that, as long as the fiduciary acts in the best interests of the principal, the fiduciary is not subject to
liability).
337. See, e.g., J.A. ex rel. Atkins v. Ja-Ru, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 3640 (DAB)(KNF), 2011 WL
990167, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011) (“A court’s role in reviewing a proposed infant compromise
is to ensure the settlement is ‘fair and reasonable and in the infant plaintiff’s best interests.’”
(quoting Edionwe v. Hussain, 777 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996))).
338. See, e.g., Stahl v. Rhee, 643 N.Y.S.2d 148, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“In a case where
reasonable minds may legitimately differ, the judgment of the infant’s natural guardian should
prevail.”).
339. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (explaining that the law has historically
recognized that “natural bonds of affection” result in parents acting in their children’s best interests);
Atkins, 2011 WL 990167, at *3 (giving “significant [judicial] deference” to the infant–plaintiff’s
mother regarding what settlement proposal was in the best interests of her son).
340. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (observing that “[t]he business
judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power
granted to Delaware directors”).
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would substitute more dominating judicial review for less dominating
fiduciary decision making. Accordingly, courts may safeguard liberty most
effectively in these contexts by giving fiduciaries a wide berth and
interceding only when beneficiaries present clear and convincing evidence of
abuse or neglect.341
What if a decision has not been entrusted to a fiduciary’s
discretionary judgment, but the fiduciary possesses expertise that is relevant
to the inquiry and superior to that of the court? Consider, for example, the
case of a corporate director who is accused of failing to pursue her
corporation’s best interests in good faith.342 Courts are usually poorly
equipped to second-guess a corporate director’s testimony that she actually
believed in good faith that her actions would advance the corporation’s best
interests.343 In such cases, the republican theory counsels that courts should
offset their own capacity for arbitrary interference by according respectful
consideration to a fiduciary’s judgments. But courts should not retreat too
far. At a minimum, they should require a corporate director to demonstrate
that her decision-making process was not unreasoned, uninformed, patently
irrational, or intentionally or recklessly indifferent to the corporation’s
interests. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he presumptive
validity of a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases where the
decision under attack is ‘so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment
that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.’”344
By placing the burden on a fiduciary to articulate a nonarbitrary rationale for
her decisions, courts can protect beneficiaries from being dominated by their
fiduciaries while simultaneously minimizing their own capacity to exert alien
control over the fiduciary relationship.
Conversely, when neither of the two considerations favoring deference
applies, courts should not hesitate to enforce fiduciary law’s “unbending and
inveterate” conduct rules without according any special deference to the
fiduciary.345 De novo review is the appropriate standard, therefore, when
evaluating whether a trustee or corporate director has engaged in fraud or

341. See, e.g., In re Beidel Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 29, 31 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 1958) (“It is . . .
the task of the guardian in the performance of its duties to determine whether a proposed expenditure
is necessary for the care, maintenance or education of the minor. The Court should not be asked to
perform the guardian’s function.”).
342. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66–67 (Del. 2006) (“A
failure to act in good faith may be shown . . . where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation . . . .” (quoting with approval In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005))).
343. See, e.g., In re PSE & G S’holders Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 315 (N.J. 2002) (accepting board
member testimony denying any negligence in the absence of contradictory evidence).
344. Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (quoting In re J.P. Stevens
& Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
345. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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self-dealing in violation of their duty of loyalty.346 Such matters are not
entrusted to a fiduciary’s discretionary judgment, and judges are better
qualified to resolve them in a nonarbitrary manner. Hence, de novo review
of these issues is the best approach for minimizing overall net domination.
Determining the optimal degree of separation between fiduciary law’s
conduct and decision rules is obviously a very complex, context-sensitive
challenge that this Article cannot fully work out in the limited space that
remains.347 For present purposes, the critical point to appreciate is simply
that the republican theory offers resources for tackling this problem. In
particular, it underscores that judicial standards of review must account for
the comparative threats that fiduciary power and judicial power pose to
freedom from domination. Although the republican theory affirms that
fiduciary law’s uncompromising conduct rules are genuine legal obligations,
it supports deferential decision rules in many settings to ensure that judicial
review does not increase overall, net domination in the fiduciary relationship.
The republican theory thus clarifies how legislatures and courts should design
judicial standards of review to maximize freedom from domination.
Conclusion
Fiduciary law is predicated on the idea that “[n]o man can serve two
masters”: “‘the same person cannot act for himself, and at the same time, with
respect to the same matter, as agent for another, whose interest might be in
conflict with his’; nor can he be allowed to profit by his own wrong, even if
such be only constructive wrong.”348 For nearly three centuries, jurists
throughout the common law world have tried to justify this fundamental
precept based on classical liberalism’s vision of freedom as noninterference,
arguing that fiduciary law serves a prophylactic function, deterring fiduciary
self-dealing and redressing the material harm caused by fiduciary
opportunism. Yet, as scholars who operate within this tradition have begun
to recognize, classical liberalism does not offer a particularly compelling
justification for preventing a fiduciary from serving two masters—her
beneficiaries and herself—in transactions where both sides demonstrably

346. See, e.g., Scrushy v. Tucker, 70 So. 3d 289, 312–13 (Ala. 2011) (holding that Delaware’s
business judgment rule does not apply to fraud or other illegal activity).
347. I take up this challenge in a forthcoming essay. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Law’s
Mixed Messages, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon
Smith eds., forthcoming 2018).
348. City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W. 812, 814 (Minn. 1913) (quoting Stone v.
Bevans, 92 N.W. 520, 520 (Minn. 1902)); see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939)
(stressing that a director “cannot by the intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient precept
against serving two masters”).
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stand to profit.349 Nor can classical liberalism credibly explain why
constructive trust and disgorgement are appropriate remedies for fiduciary
disloyalty. Viewed purely from the perspective of classical liberalism,
therefore, it is tempting to dismiss fiduciary law’s signature features as
outdated relics of equity’s Bleak House era.350
This Article has explained why the classical liberal critique of traditional
fiduciary duties and remedies is unpersuasive. Fiduciary law’s unique
structure reflects a republican commitment to freedom from domination.
Fiduciaries are not entitled to serve two masters—their beneficiaries and
themselves—because fiduciary power would compromise beneficiaries’
liberty if it were not exercised for their exclusive benefit. When fiduciaries
engage in conflicted transactions without their beneficiaries’ informed
consent, they may or may not harm their beneficiaries’ material interests, but
they always wrong their beneficiaries by treating their office as an instrument
for advancing their own unilateral interests in breach of the trust reposed in
them. The traditional fiduciary remedies of rescission, constructive trust, and
disgorgement are perfectly suited to rectify this kind of wrong and thereby
eliminate the domination that would otherwise plague fiduciary relationships.
Fiduciary law thus safeguards liberty in relationships of trust and confidence
by empowering private parties and emancipating them from domination.

349. See Langbein, supra note 77, at 934–35 (disputing Bogert’s assertion that “[i]t is not
possible for any person to act fairly in the same transaction on behalf of himself and in the interest
of the trust beneficiary”).
350. See supra note 128–30 and accompanying text.

